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In today’s society, most people receive their health insurance through their 
employers.1 If their employment-based insurer engages in cost cutting that leads to 
patient injury, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 
preemption means that these people have no state tort-based recourse against their 
insurers.2 ERISA is a federal statute that regulates employee benefit plans, and the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the ERISA statute to preempt most beneficiary state 
tort claims against an employment-based insurer.3 In other words, even if the insurer, 
and not the doctor, caused the patient’s harm, the patient with employment-based 
insurance can only sue their health care provider for medical malpractice, with very 
limited federal remedies available against the insurer. However, when the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) individual exchanges come into play in 2014, the number of 
individuals with non-employment-based insurance will likely expand and so will 
their remedies for insurer cost cutting that results in patient harm. 
 Imagine it is 2014 and Bill Smith does not have employment-based insurance, so 
he buys insurance from a Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”), XYZ 
Insurance Company, through his State’s individual exchange. XYZ is concerned 
about high costs within the individual exchange, so they have set up incentives or 
bonuses for general practitioners in their network to keep patients in-house, if at all 
possible, instead of referring them to specialists. Bill Smith goes to see Dr. Jones, a 
general practitioner in XYZ’s network, for treatment for a skin lesion. Dr. Jones is 
eager to receive his bonus, concerned that excessive referrals might cause him to be 
terminated from XYZ’s network, and believes that the lesion is a simple cyst that he 
can dispose of without referral to a specialist. Accordingly, Dr. Jones treats the cyst 
in-house. Unfortunately, the cyst is actually a virulent form of cancer that requires 
highly skilled treatment from a dermatologist and/or oncologist. Due to the delay in 
receiving specialty care, Bill dies and his estate sues Dr. Jones for malpractice and 
XYZ under theories of corporate negligence and apparent agency. 
Since Bill is buying his insurance through the individual exchange and not 
receiving his insurance through his employer, ERISA preemption does not apply, 
                                                                                                                                            
 1 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, 
at 21 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf (finding 
that 55.1% of Americans receive their health insurance through their employer, whereas only 
3.6% directly purchased their insurance coverage). 
 2 Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 33, 46-47 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA to 
preempt State law claims against employment-based HMOs without providing a federal 
substitute remedy). 
 3 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (holding that the ERISA 
enforcement scheme is the exclusive remedy for plan participants and beneficiaries and “that 
varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of [the ERISA enforcement scheme] 
would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress”). 
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and therefore his tort claim against XYZ is a viable claim.4 On the surface, equity 
favors providing an individual exchange beneficiary with recourse for insurer 
wrongdoing, especially when compared to the lack of remedies available to 
beneficiaries with employment-based insurance. However, the situation is not so 
simple and raises a troubling dilemma. While the lack of ERISA preemption opens 
up a new damage recovery source for individual exchange beneficiaries, it hinders 
the ability of individual exchange insurers to engage in cost cutting measures that 
eliminate waste and fight potentially high costs within the exchanges.5 High costs, in 
turn, will likely be passed along to beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums. 
Given the impacts of the lack of ERISA preemption within the individual exchanges, 
to quote “Men at Work,” insurers will “not be the only one[s] saying it’s a mistake.”6 
This Article seeks to address this dilemma in an effort to balance beneficiary 
access to damages when insurer cost cutting causes harm and properly incentivize 
insurers to engage in beneficial cost cutting and to keep down exchange costs, so that 
the exchanges can thrive. Section I starts by outlining insurance coverage access 
problems for high-risk individuals prior to the passage of the ACA, and the ACA’s 
efforts to expand coverage access. Section II addresses concerns that the ACA access 
expansion provisions may lead to adverse selection and high costs with regard to the 
individual exchanges. Section III outlines how insurers may respond to adverse 
selection and high costs within the individual exchanges through cost cutting 
measures. Section IV discusses insurer tort liability, the operation of ERISA 
preemption, and the impact of the lack of ERISA preemption on the individual 
exchanges. Finally, Section V outlines potential solutions to the ERISA problem 
with a proposal for a no-fault insurer liability fund solution. 
I. INSURANCE COVERAGE ACCESS 
A. Pre-ACA Insurance Access Problems 
Prior to the ACA, many individual consumers without employment-based health 
insurance—especially those who were high-risk—had difficulty procuring affordable 
or, in some cases, any health insurance.7 The culprits behind these access problems 
have been adverse selection and insurer efforts to combat adverse selection. Adverse 
selection is the tendency of high-risk, costly consumers to seek out health insurance 
coverage, more so than low-risk, less costly consumers.8 The former are more 
motivated to seek out insurance because they have superior knowledge about their 
                                                                                                                                            
 4 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (ERISA preempts State law as applied to employee benefit 
plans). 
 5 Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years War”: The 
Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 316-17 (2004) 
(arguing that ERISA preemption has allowed managed care to be more ruthless in its cost 
cutting strategies).  
 6 MEN AT WORK, IT’S A MISTAKE (Epic 1983). 
 7 Stewart Jay, On Slippery Constitutional Slopes and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. 
L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2012) (noting that historically, health insurance has been unaffordable 
and unavailable to those that do not have Medicaid, Medicare, or receive insurance through 
their employer). 
 8 Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 
YALE L.J. 1223, 1235-37 (2004). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
78 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:75 
risk level than insurers do.9 As more and more high-risk beneficiaries seek out 
coverage, insurance rates rise to cover the costs of the high-risk population and more 
and more low-risk enrollees drop coverage.10 The result is a death spiral, as 
premiums continue to rise and more and more healthy consumers drop coverage.11  
  In the pre-ACA world, insurers used a variety of tools to combat adverse 
selection, including pre-existing condition exclusions, experience rating, waiting 
periods, and rescission based on nondisclosure of pre-existing condition.12 However, 
insurers focused these efforts primarily on the individual market because the large 
group and self-insured markets13—which were mostly large group employers—were 
thought to function well without much adverse selection.14 Moreover, ERISA and 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) limited the 
ability of employment-based insurers and self-insured employers, but not individual 
insurers, to use such tools.15 Accordingly, the primary focus of insurer favorable 
selection measures, such as cherry-picking, experience rating, pre-existing condition 
exclusion, and rescission, was the individual market.16  
While favorable selection measures can keep down insurance costs, they 
obviously hinder access for high-risk beneficiaries. Hence, the pre-ACA access 
problems for high-risk individuals.17 Insurers used favorable selection tools to screen 
out or price these individuals out of the market, keep costs down, and avoid the 
                                                                                                                                            
 9 Id. at 1223 (describing adverse selection as a process whereby enrollees “utilize private 
knowledge of their own riskiness when deciding to buy or forgo insurance”). 
 10 Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law: A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 44 
(2012). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 134-35 (2011) (explaining that insurers have 
rescinded coverage for even innocent omissions or misstatements on policy applications); Len 
M. Nichols, State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
175, 179-80 (2000) (explaining that individual insurance markets collapse unless insurers can 
use pre-existing condition exclusions and waiting periods to combat adverse selection). 
 13 Self-insured plans are those in which the employer pays out employee insurance claims 
directly and no insurer is involved. 
 14 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps & 
Border Crossing Techniques & How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
27, 29 (2011). 
 15 Id. at 29-30. 
 16 Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 176 (describing individual health insurance 
markets as dysfunctional for both low-risk and high-risk enrollees, subjecting both “to 
significant risks associated with unanticipated coverage restrictions, rescissions, non-renewals, 
large rate increases, and preexisting condition exclusions”). 
 17 JULIE PEPER ET AL., WAKELY CONSULTING GROUP, ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) ON SMALL GROUP & INDIVIDUAL MARKET PREMIUMS IN 
OREGON 26 (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.wakely.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/10/OR_ACA_Market_Premium_Impact_wletter_20120731.pdf (finding a 25% 
insurance denial rate in Oregon’s individual market). 
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death spiral. Consequently, prior to the ACA, not much of an individual health 
insurance market existed, especially not for those considered to be high-risk.18 
B. ACA Insurance Access Expansion and the Benefit to High-Risk Beneficiaries 
The ACA transforms the existing health insurance market by expanding 
insurance access for all, but particularly for high-risk beneficiaries. Broadly, it does 
so through a voluntary Medicaid expansion,19 the creation of insurance exchanges,20 
and various prohibitions against favorable selection tools within the individual 
insurance market.21 With these changes, individual high-risk consumers who 
previously did not have access to insurance should have access to a new marketplace 
for insurance.  
To illustrate the drastic change, in 2009, the individual insurance market covered 
only 16.7 million people or 6% of the insurance market.22 By 2020, the individual 
exchange market is predicted to grow to 26.9 million, or even as much as 65.3 
million, if employers drop employment-based coverage and shift employees onto the 
individual market.23 These numbers could be even higher, as the Congressional 
Budget Office has predicted that the now optional nature of the Medicaid expansion 
will grow the exchanges further.24  
A number of ACA reforms are directly aimed at improving insurance access for 
high-risk beneficiaries both inside and outside of the exchanges. Such regulations 
include the guarantee access and renewability requirements,25 the prohibition against 
premiums based on health status,26 the prohibition against discrimination based on 
                                                                                                                                            
 18 Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public Assistance, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 847, 885-86 (2002) (arguing that cash-based assistance to individuals to 
purchase health insurance is not sufficient to expand coverage because of the lack of robust 
individual health insurance markets in the United States). 
 19 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2013). 
 20 Id. § 18031. 
 21 Id. §§ 300gg-300gg-7 (provisions prohibiting preexisting condition exclusions, 
requiring modified community rating, requiring guaranteed availability and renewability of 
coverage, prohibiting discrimination based on health status, providing for Essential Health 
Benefits coverage, and prohibiting excessive waiting periods). 
 22 PAUL H. KECKLEY ET AL., DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, THE IMPACT OF 
HEALTH REFORM ON THE INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET: A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 4 
(2011), available at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents/Health%20Reform%20Issues%20Briefs/us_chs_HealthReformAndTheIndividualI
nsuranceMarket_IssueBrief_101011.pdf.  
 23 Id. at 7-8. 
 24 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 12 (July 2012), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-
CoverageEstimates.pdf (predicting that the Supreme Court decision on the Medicaid 
expansion will grow the exchange rolls by 3 million by the year 2022). 
 25 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-1(a), -2(a) (West 2013). 
 26 Id. § 300gg(a). 
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health status,27 the prohibition against preexisting condition exclusions,28 and the 
prohibition against waiting periods of longer than ninety days.29 Each of these 
requirements and prohibitions is aimed at practices that insurers previously used to 
screen out high-risk beneficiaries, keep costs down, and avoid adverse selection.  
Similarly, the ACA’s Essential Health Benefits (“EHBs”) requirement benefits 
high-risk beneficiaries by mandating that small group and individual insurers, both 
inside and outside of the exchanges, guarantee beneficiaries access to certain 
EHBs,30 such as hospitalization and emergency services.31 Moreover, insurers must 
cover at least 60% of the actuarial value of EHBs.32 In other words, an insurer cannot 
eliminate or limit a particular essential benefit for a high-risk group of beneficiaries 
just because it would be too expensive to provide such coverage for those 
beneficiaries. The ACA also prohibits insurers from offering EHBs in such a way as 
to discriminate against individuals on the basis of age, disability, or life 
expectancy.33 In a similar vein, insurers are prohibited from denying EHBs to 
beneficiaries on the basis of age, life expectancy, present or predicted disability, 
dependency, or quality of life.34 
The ACA EHB requirement also aims to level the playing field of coverage 
content between employment-based coverage and individual coverage, such that 
those with employment-based insurance do not have a wider scope of coverage for 
essential benefits than those who obtain insurance through the exchanges.35 The 
EHB requirement provides that small group and individual insurers must ensure that 
the essential benefits offered are equal in scope to those offered under a typical 
employer plan.36  
II. HIGH COSTS, ADVERSE SELECTION, AND THE ACA COVERAGE ACCESS 
EXPANSION 
If all of these ACA access expansion provisions applied equally inside and 
outside the exchanges, then costs associated with increased access for high-risk 
beneficiaries could be spread across the entire industry. However, the regulatory 
structure of the ACA tends to treat some insurers differently than others, and as a 
result, will tend to push high-risk beneficiaries into the individual exchanges. 
                                                                                                                                            
 27 Id. § 300gg-4(a). 
 28 Id. § 300gg-3(a). 
 29 Id. § 300gg-7. 
 30 Id. § 300gg-6(a). 
 31 Id. § 18022(b). 
 32 Id. § 18022(d). 
 33 Id. § 18022(b)(4)(B). 
 34 Id. § 18022(b)(4)(D). 
 35 Troy Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping it Simple: Health Plan Benefit 
Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241, 
290 (2011). 
 36 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(2)(A) (West 2010). 
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Moreover, there are inherent structural weaknesses in the new health care delivery 
system created under the ACA, creating a recipe for high costs and adverse selection.  
A. High Costs and the Uneven Regulation of the Exchange Versus Non-Exchange 
Markets 
The uneven regulatory structure of the ACA is first found in the ACA’s more 
stringent regulation of exchange plans compared to plans sold outside of the 
exchange. This is not to say that the ACA does not attempt to level the playing field 
between plans that are offered both inside and outside of the exchanges. For 
example, as long as a single plan is being offered both inside and outside the 
exchange, the insurer offering that single plan must treat the beneficiaries within that 
plan as part of a single risk pool with the same premiums, whether they buy into the 
plan inside or outside of the exchange.37 Beneficiaries inside and outside of the 
exchange are also entitled to the same EHBs, provided they are not part of a self-
insured, large group, or grandfathered health plan.38 These prohibitions try to prevent 
the insurance exchanges from becoming a dumping ground for costly high-risk 
individuals.  
Despite these efforts, there are still additional regulatory burdens that fall solely 
upon the shoulders of exchange plans, allowing insurers who choose to offer 
coverage solely outside of the exchanges to avoid the level playing field 
requirements.39 Such additional regulatory burdens include requirements for provider 
network adequacy, health care quality reporting, grievance procedures, marketing 
practices, and benefit design.40 Comparatively lax regulations imposed on plans sold 
outside of the exchanges allow those plans to design coverage to attract low-risk 
beneficiaries, while driving costly high-risk beneficiaries into the exchanges.41 
Moreover, even though the ACA requires that insurance plans, whether offered 
inside or outside of the exchange, fall into one of four decreasing actuarial value 
categories—platinum, gold, silver, or bronze42—a bronze plan sold inside the 
                                                                                                                                            
 37 Id. § 18032(c) (providing for the single risk pool requirement); Id. § 18021(a)(1)(C)(iii) 
(2010) (requiring Qualified Health Plans to offer the same premium for a single plan 
regardless of whether it is purchased inside or outside of the exchange). But see SARAH 
LUECK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES SHOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO 
LIMIT ADVERSE SELECTION AMONG HEALTH PLANS IN THE EXCHANGE 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-28-11health.pdf (noting that it will be difficult to enforce the 
single risk pool requirement). 
 38 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(a) (West 2013); Stacey A. Torvino, All Illnesses are (Not) 
Created Equal: Reforming Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8 (2012) 
(noting that grandfathered plans, large group plans, and self-insured plans are excluded from 
the EHB requirement). 
 39 Paul Westfall, Ethically Economic: The Affordable Care Act’s Impact on the 
Administration of Health Benefits, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 99, 129 (2011) (explaining 
how previous attempts at state-based health insurance exchanges led to cherry-picking, where 
some insurers would offer cheaper plans outside of the exchanges, which would tend to attract 
healthier enrollees, leaving the sickest enrollees to seek coverage through the exchanges). 
 40 LUECK, supra note 37, at 6. 
 41 Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating to Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance 
Exchanges, 20-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 252 (2011). 
 42 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d) (West 2010). 
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exchanges may look different than one sold outside the exchanges. No two bronze 
plans need look alike, as long as actuarial equivalency requirements are met between 
the two.43 Therefore, the insurer who only sells its bronze plan outside of the 
exchange could manipulate the design of its bronze plan, such as the co-pay and 
deductible structure, to attract less costly, low-risk beneficiaries.44  
Some States may actually worsen the regulatory disparity between the exchange 
insurance market and non-exchange insurance market. States are primarily 
responsible for regulating the non-exchange insurance markets.45 Accordingly, they 
could eliminate the disparities between the two markets by taking action to regulate 
the non-exchange market to mirror the regulation of exchange market.46 However, 
many States will not do so because they are politically opposed to health care 
reform, including the exchanges. They view the exchanges as an overreach of federal 
regulation that sacks the States with the costs of operating the exchanges.47 In fact, 
as of May 2013, twenty-seven States have deferred to the federal government to set 
up insurance exchanges in those States.48 There is fear that such opposition States 
might sabotage the exchanges by failing to level the regulatory playing field, 
refusing to enforce the ACA insurance reforms, and/or refusing to set up the risk 
adjustment and reinsurance programs.49  
B. High Costs Associated with Uneven Regulation of Individual Plans Versus Large 
Group and Self-Insured Plans 
Adverse selection and high costs within the individual exchanges are also likely 
to occur because of differences in how the ACA regulates individual and small group 
insurers versus large group and self-insured plans, particularly the latter.50 To 
                                                                                                                                            
 43 Greaney, supra note 41, at 250-51. 
 44 Id.  
 45 Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 28 (2011) 
(noting that States retain their traditional regulatory role over insurance, but that the federal 
regulatory power over insurance is expanded, particularly within the insurance exchanges). 
 46 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Commonwealth Fund, Health Insurance Exchanges and the 
Affordable Care Act: Eight Difficult Issues, ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 27 (2011) 
(arguing that States could keep costs down in the exchanges if they similarly regulate health 
plans outside of the exchanges and/or are careful not to impose extra costs on exchange 
plans). 
 47 Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health Care Regulation: 
The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266, 291-92 (2011) 
[hereinafter Moncrieff, Centralization] (discussing the irony of State opposition to the 
exchanges despite the ACA’s intent to provide States with flexibility in operating the 
exchanges). 
 48 State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Marketplaces, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (May 28, 2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insurance-
exchanges. 
 49 Jost, supra note 46, at 13 (noting that State regulatory opposition to the exchanges could 
lead to adverse selection and threaten the viability of the exchanges). 
 50 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732-33 (1985) (explaining the 
difference between insured and self-insured plans). 
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illustrate the differences between how the ACA regulates these different insurance 
markets, it is helpful to think of the ACA insurance reforms as applying to four 
different insurance markets: self-insured plans; individual plans and small group 
employment plans;51 grandfathered health plans; and large group plans. The ACA 
most heavily regulates the individual and small group plans, especially those that are 
sold within the exchanges.52 Large group employer plans are generally subject to 
fewer ACA regulations and are regulated jointly by ERISA and State insurance 
regulations.53 Self-insured plans are subject to even fewer ACA regulations than 
large group employer plans, are exempt from State insurance regulation, and are 
almost completely regulated by ERISA.54  
As a result of these differing levels of regulation, some scholars contend that 
large employers, especially self-insured employers, will engage in targeted dumping 
of high-risk employees onto the individual exchanges, thereby creating an adverse 
selection problem for the individual exchanges.55 Targeted dumping is likely to 
occur because a number of consumer protection provisions that apply to individual 
and small group plans do not apply to large employer plans and/or self-insured plans.  
First, the ACA imposes only limited new coverage requirements upon self-
insured and large group plans, namely the requirements to cover clinical trials, to 
cover preventive services without cost sharing, to limit out-of-pocket spending, and 
to not impose annual or lifetime limits on coverage.56 These same new benefit 
requirements also apply to individual and small group plans, but the individual and 
small group plans are subject to additional requirements that do not apply to large 
group fully-insured and self-insured plans, such as the EHB requirements,57 single-
risk pool requirement,58 and the prohibition against engaging in discriminatory 
premium setting.59 Accordingly, compared to large group plans and self-insured 
plans, small group and individual insurers, especially those within the exchanges, are 
required to provide more comprehensive and non-discriminatory coverage, which is 
more costly to provide and tends to attract high-risk enrollees.60  
                                                                                                                                            
 51 This market can technically be broken down into two sub-markets: individual and small 
group plans sold inside the exchange, and individual and small group plans sold outside the 
exchange. 
 52 Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1585 (2011). 
 53 Id. at 1592 (noting that after the ACA, the large group market will continue to be lightly 
regulated by ERISA and HIPAA with fewer new ACA regulations impacting that market). 
 54 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), b(2)(B) (2006); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) 
(interpreting ERISA to exempt self-insured plans from State regulation). 
 55 Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 128. 
 56 Id. at 147-48 (outlining the few specific ACA coverage mandates that apply to both the 
individual market and the large group and self-insured plan markets). 
 57 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(a) (West 2013). 
 58 Id. § 18032(c) (West 2010). 
 59 Id. § 18032(c). 
 60 JONATHAN GRUBER, COLORADO HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
12-13 (2012), available at http://dailycaller.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Colorado_ 
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Second, two out of three of the ACA’s risk adjustment programs do not apply to 
many large group plans and/or self-insured plans.61 The third risk adjustment 
program, the permanent risk adjustment program, also excludes self-insured plans.62 
As these programs operate to take away the incentive for targeting only risk 
beneficiaries, self-insured plans and large group insurers have no incentive not to 
dump their high-risk beneficiaries onto the exchanges and keep their low-risk 
beneficiaries.63 
Third, the ACA encourages large group and self-insured plans to dump high-risk 
beneficiaries onto the exchange through the ACA wellness program provisions. As 
long as certain strict requirements are met, the wellness provisions allow employers 
to reward employees with premium and cost-sharing reductions, when they achieve 
or maintain health goals, such as weight loss or a healthy BMI.64 The premium 
reductions can be as high as thirty percent65 and employers can use such programs to 
favor and reduce costs for low risk employees, while driving high-risk employees 
onto the individual exchanges.66 While the ACA prohibits using these programs as a 
subterfuge for discriminating against high-risk employees based on health status, 
some scholars contend that it will be impossible to enforce this provision.67  
                                                                                                                                            
Gruber_Jan_2012_NARRATIVE.pdf (predicting, within Colorado, that the EHB requirement 
will drive up individual market insurance premiums by 5.3%); JILL S. HERBOLD & PAUL R. 
HOUCHENS, INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP PREMIUM CHANGES UNDER THE ACA, 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.in.gov/aca/files/Individual_SmallPremium_Increases.pdf (predicting, 
within Indiana, that the EHB requirement will drive up premiums in the individual market by 
20% to 30%); PEPER ET AL., supra note 17, at 21 (predicting, within Oregon, that the EHB 
requirement will drive up premiums by 6% in the individual market); JENNIFER SMAGULA & 
JONATHAN GRUBER, THE IMPACT OF THE ACA ON WISCONSIN’S HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET, 
22 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/aboutdhs/docs/WI-Final-Report-July-
18-2011.pdf (predicting, within Wisconsin, that the EHB requirement will drive up individual 
market insurance premiums by 6% to 7%). 
 61 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061-62 (West 2010) (applying the ACA’s temporary reinsurance and 
risk corridor programs solely to the individual and small group markets). 
 62 Id. § 18063 (providing that “each State shall assess a charge on health plans and health 
insurance issuers (with respect to health insurance coverage) . . . if the actuarial risk of the 
enrollees of such plans or coverage for a year is less than the average actuarial risk of all 
enrollees in all plans or coverage in such State for such year that are not self-insured group 
health plans (which are subject to the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974)”). 
 63 Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 151 (arguing that the “ACA largely excludes 
employers, especially those that are self-insured, from the risk-sharing arrangements described 
above that are designed to mute insurers’ incentives to attract comparatively healthy risks”). 
 64 Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 
CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 214-17 (2008) (providing a summary of the ACA’s wellness program 
provisions). 
 65 42 U.S.C.A § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (West 2010). 
 66 Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 169. 
 67 Id. (arguing that “the core problem [with enforcement] is that in order to incentivize 
healthy living, a wellness program must provide benefits only to those who are, in fact, 
healthier”). 
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The contrast in ACA regulations applying to individual and small group plans 
versus employment-based plans plainly provides a foundation and open invitation 
for employers to engage in selective dumping of high-risk employees onto the 
individual exchanges. Self-insured plans, even more than large group plans, are 
likely to engage in selective dumping because of the complete absence of State 
regulation and limited federal regulation.68 Unlike large group plans, self-insured 
plans may also exacerbate adverse selection problems for the exchanges by gaming 
the exchange system. More specifically, employers may choose to self-insure, design 
plans that are low cost with thin coverage and remain that way as long as their health 
care costs are low.69 Then, if and when their health care costs spike, they can fully-
insure and purchase through the exchange, if they are a small employer, or dump 
their employees on the exchange, thereby flooding the exchange with high-risk 
beneficiaries.70  
 While the world of self-insured plans may seem like a limited universe of large 
employers, it is a growing universe.71 Small employers who self-insure no longer 
need to worry about directly absorbing the impact of catastrophic claims, as a series 
of court decisions have held that an employer can purchase stop-loss insurance with 
a low attachment point72 and still remain self-insured for ERISA preemption 
purposes.73 With the increasing trend towards small employers self-insuring, the 
problem of selective dumping and accompanying adverse selection for the individual 
exchanges may be larger than predicted. 
C. Low-Risk Individuals Choosing Grandfathered Health Plans 
Regulatory differences similarly arise when comparing individual exchange 
plans to grandfathered health plans. Grandfathered plans are plans that existed as of 
the date of the ACA’s enactment,74 and such plans are exempt from many of the 
ACA’s consumer protection regulations. For purposes of this article, some of the 
                                                                                                                                            
 68 Id. at 159. 
 69 Jost, supra note 46, at 19-20. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Kathryn Linehan, Nat’l Health Pol’y Forum, Self-Insurance and the Potential Effects of 
Health Reform on the Small-Group Market 1, 3 (2010), available at http://www.nhpf.org/ 
library/issue-briefs/IB840_PPACASmallGroup_12-21-10.pdf (noting that in 2009, 82.1% of 
firms with 500 or more employees offered self-insured health plans, but only13.5% of firms 
with fewer than 100 employees did so). Large employers choose to self-insure because they 
can afford to cover the risk of directly insuring their employees.  
 72 CHRISTINE EIBNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMPLOYER SELF-
INSURANCE DECISIONS & THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT AS MODIFIED BY THE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 
(ACA) 1, 93 (2011), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/LGHPstudy/ 
EmployerSIDACA.pdf (finding that 1/3 of small employers will self-insure if attachment 
points are as low as $20,000). A low attachment point for triggering stop-loss insurance 
largely shifts the risk to the stop-loss insurer. 
 73 Bill Gray Enters. v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 2001); Thompson v. Talquin 
Bldg. Prods., 928 F.2d 649, 653 (4th Cir. 1991); United Food & Commercial Workers v. 
Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 74 42 U.S.C.A. § 18011 (West 2010).  
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most relevant exclusions, include the requirement to provide EHBs, guaranteed issue 
and renewability, the prohibition against discrimination based on health status, the 
requirement to use modified community rating for premium setting, the requirement 
to provide internal and external grievance procedures, and the requirement to 
provide unimpeded access to emergency, pediatric, obstetric, and gynecological 
care.75 Moreover, individual, but not group, grandfathered health plans can still use 
pre-existing condition exclusions, longer waiting periods, and annual limits on 
benefits.76  
Significantly, grandfathered plans lose their grandfathered status if they make 
certain changes to their plan content and/or structure that disadvantage their 
enrollees.77 Because grandfathered plans are so restricted in the types of changes that 
they can make and still keep their grandfathered status, it is believed that most, if not 
all grandfathered plans will lose their status within a few years.78 Insurer efforts to 
change cost-sharing or premiums are severely hampered by the grandfathered health 
plan regulations, and therefore it will be hard for such plans to maintain their 
grandfathered status, given likely medical technology changes, changes to the plan’s 
pool of beneficiaries, and changes to the claims history of beneficiaries.79 
Nonetheless, unless or until they disappear, grandfathered health plans will likely 
cause adverse selection problems for the individual exchanges.  
To the extent that grandfathered plans continue to exist, they may promote 
adverse selection against the exchanges through lemon-dropping, or encouraging 
high-risk beneficiaries to seek coverage in the individual exchanges, while keeping 
low-risk beneficiaries within the grandfathered plan.80 Keeping only the low-risk 
beneficiaries within the grandfathered plan also allows grandfathered plans to more 
effectively avoid dealing with increasing insurance costs and having to change the 
content or structure of their insurance plan with the possibility of losing their 
grandfathered plan status. Many high-risk beneficiaries will not want to stay with 
their grandfathered plans because such plans are likely to have thinner coverage than 
                                                                                                                                            
 75 Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of 
Grandfathering Under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 766-67 (2011) (outlining 
the ACA exemptions for grandfathered plans). 
 76 Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable 
Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 247 (2012). 
 77 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2011) (providing that grandfathered health plans lose their status 
if they change their scope of benefits, increase co-insurance percentages, increase fixed-
amount cost-sharing (other than co-payments) above medical inflation plus fifteen percentage 
points, increase co-payments above five dollars plus medical inflation or medical inflation 
plus fifteen percentage points, decrease the 2010 employer contribution rate by more than five 
percent, add an annual limit on benefits where none existed in 2010, add an annual limit for a 
plan that imposed only a lifetime limit, unless the annual limit is not less than the lifetime 
limit, or lower annual limits for plans that had an annual limit in 2010). 
 78 Leonard, supra note 75, at 756 (arguing that most grandfathered plans will lose their 
status because the can make changes only for the benefit of participants and only at the plan’s 
expense). 
 79 Jost, supra note 46, at 18. 
 80 Id. at 13. 
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individual exchange plans, as a result of the fewer regulations imposed on 
grandfathered plans versus exchange-based plans.81 
Alternatively, some plans with healthy risk pools will maintain grandfathered 
plan status as long as their risk pool remains healthy, while other plans, with high-
risk pools, will abandon grandfathered plan status ab initio.82 Beneficiaries in the 
latter risk pools may immediately seek the likely comprehensive coverage available 
within the individual exchanges. As a result, these healthy risk pools of individuals 
will not be seeking coverage access through the individual exchanges, which would 
otherwise help with risk spreading and avoiding adverse selection.  
D. Young, Healthy Adults Avoiding the Individual Exchanges 
The funneling of high-risk beneficiaries into the exchanges may also be 
exacerbated by the ACA’s dependent coverage expansion, which allows parents to 
keep their children on the family health insurance policy until the child reaches the 
age of twenty-six.83 For those under the age of twenty-six without employment-
based insurance, the option may be more popular than purchasing insurance through 
the exchanges, since there is little if any additional cost to the family to add a 
dependent onto the family policy.84 For the individual exchanges, a failure of young 
and healthy individuals to seek coverage through the individual exchanges poses a 
risk selection problem. The incentive to choose the dependent coverage expansion 
over exchange-based insurance will result in many young and healthy individuals 
being carved out of the individual exchange risk pools.85 Accordingly, the individual 
exchange risk pools will be disproportionately high-risk and exchange costs and 
premiums will rise.86 
E. Higher Administrative Costs Associated with the Exchanges  
Not only will the exchanges potentially attract more high-risk beneficiaries than 
low-risk beneficiaries, but the exchanges face additional costs that the non-exchange 
markets do not face. The exchanges are required to be self-sustaining and there will 
be administrative costs associated with running the exchanges.87 The exchanges are 
expressly responsible for establishing eligibility for Medicaid and for premium tax 
credits, contracting with navigators to educate and facilitate individual enrollment in 
plans, operating a consumer hot line, hosting a consumer website with comparative 
health plan information, rating exchange plans on quality and price and providing 
consumers with a calculator for determining insurance costs.88 While these measures 
                                                                                                                                            
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 8. 
 83 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14(a) (West 2010). 
 84 Joel C. Cantor et al., Expanding Dependent Coverage for Young Adults: Lessons from 
State Initiatives, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 99, 122 (2012) (noting that the dependent 
coverage expansion will be popular because “enrolling young adults in a parent’s plan will be 
free, at the margin, for many families”). 
 85 Id. at 123. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 49. 
 88 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4) (West 2010). 
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are beneficial for beneficiaries, they also cost money and will likely drive up costs 
within the exchanges. In past insurance exchanges, the exchanges merely dumped 
their administrative costs on top of the exchange insurers’ administrative costs, 
without attempting to reduce the latter.89 
Someone has to pay for those costs and the States are unlikely to subsidize most 
of these exchange costs.90 Accordingly, the exchanges may impose licensing, tax, or 
regulatory fees upon insurers wishing to participate in the exchanges.91 However, 
this means that providing insurance inside the exchange will be more expensive for 
these insurers, or they will likely pass along those costs to consumers in the form of 
higher premiums.92 The healthiest and least costly enrollees will likely avoid such 
exchange plans and opt for plans with lower premiums outside of the exchange.93 
Administrative costs within the exchanges will also be higher because of the 
need to create new economies of scale. Insurers in the existing individual market for 
health insurance have existing economies of scale in place.94 However, within the 
individual exchanges, insurers have to build entirely new economies of scale by 
building a whole new system of insurance, with additional administrative and 
marketing costs.95 It seems likely that exchange insurers will also pass these costs 
down to their beneficiaries through higher premiums and costs.  
F. Market Share and Risk Pool Size 
Market share size and risk pool size are also major cost concerns for the 
individual exchanges. In the past, state-based insurance exchanges have had 
difficulty attracting a sufficient number of beneficiaries to create the market share 
necessary for exchange insurers to achieve economies of scale.96 Economies of scale 
are necessary so that there is robust competition and the insurers can achieve 
administrative cost savings and exercise sufficient bargaining power to drive down 
                                                                                                                                            
 89 Elliot K. Wicks & Mark A. Hall, Purchasing Cooperatives for Small Employers: 
Performance and Prospects, 78 MILBANK QUARTERLY 4, 511-46 (2000). 
 90 Jost, supra note 46, at 49 (arguing that States are unlikely to reimburse the exchanges 
for costs other than those associated with processing applications for State health care 
programs, like Medicaid). 
 91 Jessica D. Allen, Note, A Way Forward: Establishing Financially Self-Sustaining 
Health-Insurance Exchanges Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 773, 793 (2013) (exploring the use of fees on exchange insurers as a method for 
creating financially self-sustaining exchanges).  
 92 Jost, supra note 46, at 49. 
 93 Elliot K. Wicks, Cal. Healthcare Found., Building a National Insurance Exchange: 
Lessons From California 3 (2009), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20 
LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/B/PDF%20BuildingANationalInsuranceExchange.pdf (explaining 
that insurers do not like the head to head competition within exchanges for fear that if they 
need to raise their premiums, the healthiest enrollees will just leave for a competitor plan). 
 94 Westfall, supra note 39, at 118 (discussing the economic problems with the ACA 
insurance exchanges). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Wicks, supra note 93, at 3 (explaining that “an exchange is often just one health plan 
loss away from failure”). 
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prices.97 Moreover, without a sufficient number of beneficiaries, insurers lose 
interest in joining the exchanges,98 especially if the exchange risk pool is comprised 
mostly of premium subsidy beneficiaries.99 Such an exchange lacks the bargaining 
power necessary to impose upon the participating insurers standards that will be 
favorable to the beneficiaries.100 Insurers in such a situation can take more of a take 
it or leave it attitude towards the exchanges.  
A similar problem occurs if the insurance market within a State and within an 
exchange in that State is dominated by a few large insurers, who act in a 
monopolistic manner to undercut the bargaining power of the exchange.101 Whether 
insurers lose interest in the exchange or whether the insurer market is highly 
concentrated, an exchange without sufficient insurers for robust competition is an 
exchange without bargaining power, a situation that will likely lead to higher costs 
for exchange enrollees. Such an exchange will also likely have difficulty attracting 
new insurers, who would otherwise increase competition and drive down prices 
within the exchange.102Whether the lack of sufficient exchange plans is the result of 
few beneficiaries or market concentration, the effect is a vicious circle. If an 
insufficient number of plans—especially large plans—fail to join the exchanges, 
then not enough people will want to enroll through the exchanges.103 Accordingly, 
the incentive to buy through the exchanges will be reduced due to the lack of plan 
choice, and as a result, insurer competition within the exchanges will be soft and 
premiums may increase.104 
Beneficiary pool size also has an impact on administrative costs. In terms of cost 
spreading, a large pool of beneficiaries is necessary to keep per capita administrative 
costs down. There are a number of fixed costs associated with the exchanges and 
those costs will likely be passed onto enrollees.105 If there are fewer beneficiaries 
within the exchanges, then the per capita costs will be higher.106  
Small beneficiary pools can also lead to higher provider prices. Insurers contract 
with networks of providers and are able to extract price concessions from those 
                                                                                                                                            
 97 Id. 
 98 Moncrieff, Centralization, supra note 47, at 293. 
 99 Jost, supra note 46, at 28 (arguing that “if the exchange is limited to individuals who 
receive the premium tax credit, with few self-payers and small-employer participants, it will 
be unattractive to insurers and will lack bargaining power”). 
 100 Id. (arguing that such an exchange will have an unattractive risk profile and will have 
difficulty imposing minimum standards on plans joining the exchange). 
 101 Id. (arguing that exchanges will have difficulty imposing minimum standards in a 
market dominated by three or fewer insurers). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Wicks, supra note 93, at 3. 
 104 Jost, supra note 46, at 16. 
 105 Id. at 16 (explaining that administrative efficiencies are only achieved if the personnel, 
IT, publication, legal, rent and utility costs must be spread out over as many enrollees as 
possible). 
 106 Id. 
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providers, if the insurers can bring a large pool of patients to those providers.107 
However, the insurer’s bargaining power to reduce prices is greatly diminished 
where the pool of patients is small.108 As with administrative costs, those higher 
provider prices are likely to passed along to beneficiaries in the form of higher 
premiums or cost-sharing.  
Finally, an insufficient number of beneficiaries also poses an adverse selection 
problem. To avoid adverse selection, a stable exchange needs at least one hundred 
thousand enrollees with seventy-five percent of the enrollees being non-Medicare 
and non-Medicaid.109 Without a sufficiently diverse group of enrollees, risk 
spreading and cost spreading is difficult, which, of course, leads to adverse 
selection.110 Many small states with smaller risk pools may have difficulty 
maintaining viable, diverse exchange risk pools and may need to join with other 
States to create a sustainable exchange.111  
G. State Run High-Risk Pool Dumping on the Individual Exchanges 
Large employers and self-insured plans may not be the only ones engaging in 
selective dumping on the exchange, as state-run high-risk pools may seek to dump 
their beneficiaries on the exchange as quickly as possible. Prior to the ACA, a 
number of states created high-risk pools for high-risk beneficiaries,112 but the 
incentive to maintain such pools may be disappearing because of the operation of the 
ACA temporary reinsurance program for the individual market. 
The ACA’s temporary reinsurance program encourages state high-risk pools to 
cease functioning for two reasons. First, HHS has promulgated a Rule that the state 
high-risk pools are not eligible to receive any of the reinsurance money.113 
Therefore, the state high-risk pools will want to dump their beneficiaries onto the 
exchange, where insurers can use those beneficiaries to improve their eligibility for 
reinsurance funds.114  
                                                                                                                                            
 107 Id. at 17. 
 108 Id. 
 109 ALAIN ENTHOVEN ET AL., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., MAKING EXCHANGES WORK IN 
HEALTH-CARE REFORM 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/ 
MakingExchangesWorkinHealth-CareReform-1701.pdf (arguing that “an even larger size 
[pool] is preferable from the point of view of economies of scale in administration of multiple 
plans and overall market impact”). 
 110 Jost, supra note 46, at 17 (arguing that small risk pools are volatile and subject to 
destabilization by a few large claims). 
 111 Moncrieff, Centralization, supra note 47, at 293-94 (citing West Virginia as an example 
of a State that would need to create a regional exchange in order to avoid adverse selection 
problems stemming from small risk pools). 
 112 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, COVERAGE OF UNINSURABLE PRE-
EXISTING CONDITIONS: STATE AND FEDERAL HIGH-RISK POOLS, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/high-risk-pools-for-health-coverage.aspx (updated 
Feb. 2013) (noting that from 1976 through 2009, 35 States set up high-risk pools enrolling 
over 200,000 people). 
 113 42 C.F.R. §153.400(a)(2)(iii) (2013). 
 114 Brett Norman, States Rethink High-Risk-Pool Plans, POLITICO, (Jan. 29, 2013, 04:27 
AM EST), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/states-rethink-high-risk-pools-exchanges-
 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/5
2014] IT’S A MISTAKE  91 
 
Second, if one state keeps many of its high-risk enrollees in a state-run high risk 
pool, then the reinsurance assessments against insurers and self-insured plans in that 
state are more likely to flow out of state to states that eliminated their high-risk pools 
and dumped those beneficiaries onto their respective exchanges.115 The necessity for 
quickly eliminating these State-run high-risk pools is enhanced by the fact that the 
reinsurance payouts decrease over the three years of the temporary reinsurance 
program.116 
This sudden dumping phenomenon by the states could drive up costs and 
insurance premiums within the individual exchanges.117 The individuals in state 
high-risk pools are, by definition, the sickest of the sick and the costliest of the 
costly. Accordingly, quickly dumping them en masse onto the exchanges could 
cause exchange premiums to spike or make it difficult for exchange plans accepting 
those enrollees to remain financially viable.  
H. The Voluntary Medicaid Expansion and High Costs in the Individual Exchange 
State action on Medicaid may also contribute to high costs within the individual 
exchanges. First, a state’s failure to accept the ACA Medicaid expansion will likely 
drive up individual exchange premiums within that state’s exchange.118 When 
initially enacted, the ACA was supposed to expand Medicaid to those earning up to 
133% of the Federal Poverty Level (“FPL”).119 However, the Supreme Court, in 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, ruled that the expansion is optional, not 
mandatory for the States.120 In response, twenty-one States have chosen not to 
expand Medicaid.121 Accordingly, within these States, those who fall under 133% of 
                                                                                                                                            
86831.html (explaining that “the state high-risk pools may offload as many people as they can 
onto the exchanges as soon as they open in 2014 or risk losing a piece of that $20 billion 
pie”). 
 115 Id. (noting that Wisconsin is concerned that if it does not eliminate its State high-risk 
pool quickly, then reinsurance assessments on Wisconsin insurers will flow to cover the cost 
of high-cost plans in other States). 
 116 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061(b)(3)(B)(iii) (West 2010) (providing for $10 billion in reinsurance 
payments in 2014, $6 billion in 2015, and $4 billion in 2016). 
 117 GRUBER, supra note 60, at 13 (predicting that folding the Colorado high-risk pool into 
the exchange will cause Colorado individual market premiums to increase by 5.5%); HERBOLD 
& HOUCHES, supra note 60, at 1 (predicting that merging the Indiana high-risk pool into the 
individual market will drive up Indiana individual market premiums by 35% to 45%); 
SMAGULA & GRUBER, supra note 60, at 22-23 (predicting that merging the Wisconsin high-
risk pool into the individual market will drive up individual market premiums by 16%). 
 118 AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION DECISIONS ON 
PRIVATE COVERAGE 2 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.actuary.org/files/Medicaid 
_Considerations_09_05_2012.pdf (predicting that individual market premiums will go up by 
at least 2% for States that reject the Medicaid expansion). 
 119 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2013). 
 120 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, at 2607-08 (2012). 
 121 Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (as of Dec. 11, 2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/state-activity-around-
expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/. 
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FPL will be forced to seek out insurance through the individual insurance 
exchanges.122 While those under 100% of FPL will be unlikely to find any affordable 
insurance, those between 100% and 133% of FPL will be heavily incentivized to 
seek coverage through the individual exchanges because they are eligible for 
premium subsidies.123  
Exchange costs will likely increase if the exchanges are forced to absorb this 
group, between 100% and 133% of FPL. First, this group is going to be a costly, 
high-risk group with more complex medical problems.124 Second, because most of 
these beneficiaries have been previously uninsured, they will aggressively seek out 
health care now that they are insured and they will have higher initial claims costs.125 
Third, if the ACA temporary reinsurance program, described infra, applies to these 
beneficiaries, then the reinsurance amounts, which are fixed amounts per year, 
would decrease per capita with the addition of this group, resulting in higher 
premium rates for everyone else.126 Fourth, the fact that individuals with monthly or 
yearly income variation will continuously churn between Medicaid eligibility and 
exchange-based coverage or no coverage will also add to insurer costs.127 Exchange 
insurers will likely have long term, instead of short term, added “risk premiums” to 
account for both the early instability in the new market, as well as the persistent 
uncertainty of churning.128 Churning also adds to insurer administrative costs as 
insurers must continuously reestablish relationships with beneficiaries who have 
churned in and out of exchange-based coverage.129 Moreover, churning makes it 
more difficult to implement a permanent risk adjustment program, described infra, 
that fully compensates insurers with disproportionate high-risk beneficiaries.130  
Even in some States that agree to expand Medicaid, there is an effort underway 
to shift the cost of covering these newly eligible individuals onto the individual 
exchanges. For example, Arkansas is seeking an HHS waiver to purchase insurance 
                                                                                                                                            
 122 Emily Whelan Parento & Lawrence O. Gostin, Better Health, but Less Justice: 
Widening Health Disparities After National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481, 505-06 (2013). 
 123 Id. 
 124 AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 118, at 2. 
 125 CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WHY A STATE’S HEALTH INSURERS SHOULD 
SUPPORT EXPANDING MEDICAID 2 (SEPT. 2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/ 
medicaid-and-insurers-memo.pdf (arguing initial claims costs are higher for a group of 
previously uninsured people versus those who are continuously insured). 
 126 AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 118, at 2-3. 
 127 An example of churning is when someone has sporadic jobs and their income varies 
greatly from month to month, meaning that some months they are eligible for Medicaid and 
other months they will be forced to obtain insurance through the exchanges or will have no 
insurance at all in a non-Medicaid expansion State. 
 128 CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 125, at 2-3. 
 129 Id. at 3 (arguing that it will be difficult for insurers to manage chronic conditions as 
beneficiaries churn between coverage and no coverage). 
 130 Id. (arguing that it will be difficult to implement an effective risk adjustment system 
where a significant portion of a State’s population remains uninsured). 
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from the individual exchanges for the newly eligible Medicaid population.131 Instead 
of the state fully internalizing the cost of insuring these newly eligible beneficiaries, 
the state is putting the burden on insurers within the individual exchange to provide 
coverage and manage the cost of their care. Other states are considering following 
suit.132 
For the individual exchanges, this alternative Medicaid expansion proposal 
drives up costs in a number of ways. First, this Medicaid group has a higher 
morbidity rate, thereby driving up premiums, the cost of which must be covered by 
either other exchange beneficiaries or by federal subsidies.133 Second, this group 
increases the overall demand for care services, driving up provider reimbursement 
demands, thereby leading to higher premiums.134 Third, as with the group of 
beneficiaries between 100% and 133% of FPL, if the ACA temporary reinsurance 
program applies to these Medicaid beneficiaries, then the per capita reinsurance 
amounts would decrease per capita, resulting in higher premium rates for everyone 
else.135 
I. The ACA’s Attempt to Push Back Against Adverse Selection and High Costs within 
the Individual Exchanges 
To some extent the ACA implements measures designed to avoid adverse 
selection and high cost problems. For example, the individual mandate aims to 
eliminate adverse selection by requiring most individuals to either purchase 
insurance or pay a tax penalty, with certain exemptions.136 The point of the 
individual mandate is to push healthy individuals into the individual insurance 
market, so that adverse selection is less likely to occur.137 The individual mandate 
spreads the risk, as the healthy individuals pay more in premiums than they spend on 
health care, thereby cross-subsidizing high-risk beneficiaries and preventing adverse 
                                                                                                                                            
 131 Sara Rosenbaum, HealthReformGPS, Using Medicaid Funds to Buy Qualified Health 
Plan Coverage for Medicaid Beneficiaries (2013) available at http://www.healthreformgps. 
org/wp-content/uploads/SR-Arkansas-premium-support-pdf.pdf. 
 132 Julie Piotrowski, Health Affairs, Premium Assistance in Medicaid, HEALTH POL’Y BRIEF 
3 (2013), available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief 
_94.pdf (reporting that Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Florida are considering a similar 
plan). 
 133 ROBERT M. DAMLER ET AL., MILLIMAN, CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEDICAID EXPANSION 
THROUGH HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE COVERAGE 5 (2013), available at http:// 
publications.milliman.com/publications/healthreform/pdfs/considerations-for-medicaid-
expansion.pdf (noting that the “morbidity difference between those with incomes below 138% 
of FPL may be 15% to 25% greater than those with incomes in the range of 138% to 300% of 
FPL”). 
 134 Id. at 4. 
 135 Id. at 5. 
 136 See generally 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (Westlaw 2010). 
 137 Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 35, at 282-83 (explaining that the individual 
mandate prevents healthy individuals from gaming the system by waiting until they get sick to 
purchase insurance).  
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selection.138For several reasons, the individual mandate may not be as powerful in 
fighting adverse selection and tamping down costs as first appears. First, the 
mandate penalty is not that much of a “big stick” in terms of a penalty, at least not 
until 2016. In 2014, the mandate penalty is the greater of $95 per person or 1% of 
your income above the income tax filing limit, and $395 per person or 2% of your 
income above the income tax filing limit in 2015.139 Even when fully implemented, 
in 2016, the mandate penalty is the greater of $695 per person or 2.5% of your 
income above the income tax filing limit.140 These penalties may not be strong 
enough to incentivize healthy people to purchase insurance.141 Individuals value 
losses more than they value gains, so they are more willing to forego the penalty and 
pay for the value of insurance, only if the penalty is high enough.142  
Moreover, for at least some people, the delta between the penalty amount and the 
cost of insurance is large, with the insurance plan costing much more than the 
penalty. The average premium cost for a bronze level exchange plan could be 
between $4,500 and $5,000 per year,143 whereas someone earning a little over 
$50,000 per year faces a 2.5% penalty or roughly $1,000,144 a delta of $4,000 or 
more. If such a moderate income individual is healthy, they face a low incentive to 
pay an extra $4,000 or more to buy insurance and avoid the penalty.145 When the 
penalties are low compared to the cost of insurance, healthy non-risk-averse people 
will be willing to forgo insurance and pay the penalty.  
For others, there is absolutely no penalty-based incentive to purchase insurance. 
These individuals will be exempt from the mandate because the annual cost of the 
lowest cost bronze level plan is more than 8% of their annual income, after taking 
                                                                                                                                            
 138 Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 781, 787 (2011).  
 139 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c) (Westlaw 2010). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 35, at 284; PEPER ET AL., supra note 17, at 28 
(predicting, in Oregon, that premium rates in the individual market will increase by an average 
of 15% because people with high morbidity are more likely to purchase insurance than those 
who are young and healthy). But see Baker, supra note 52, at 1615-21 (arguing that the 
individual mandate penalty is strong enough to encourage sufficient participation to avoid 
adverse selection problems, and even if there is adverse selection, the exchanges will remain 
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 142 Monahan, supra note 138, at 796-97 (arguing that individuals value losses more highly 
than gains and are more likely to buy insurance and gain the value of insurance, than pay a 
high penalty). 
 143 DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND RELATED 
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER PPACA 1, 7 n.25 (2011), available at http:// 
healthreformgps.org/wpcontent/uploads/CRSreportonPPACAug2011.pdf (projecting the 
annual bronze level plan premium to be $4,800 per year); Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, 
Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Senator Olympia Snowe (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http:// 
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10884/01-11-premiums_ 
for_bronze_plan.pdf (estimating the average annual bronze level premium to be between 
$4,500 and $5,000 per year). 
 144 This accounts for a roughly $10,000 income tax filing limit. 
 145 Monahan, supra note 138, at 796-97. 
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into account any premium assistance tax credits.146 Taking into account the projected 
costs of bronze level plans, this means that some individuals earning 250% of FPL to 
approximately 500% of FPL could be exempt from the mandate because insurance 
would be unaffordable to them.147 Healthy individuals within that group, who have 
low expected health care costs may very well choose not to pay thousands of dollars 
a year for insurance.148 There is no downside for them because they are exempt from 
the mandate penalty.  
The ACA attempts to push this low-risk group into the individual exchanges by 
limiting enrollment to one annual exchange enrollment period, with an exception for 
changes in status, such as losing a job.149 The limited enrollment period is supposed 
to incentivize low-risk individuals to not game the system and wait until they get 
sick to obtain exchange-based coverage because it will not be easy to enter market. 
Still, some with non-emergent and non-chronic illness, like a future need for knee 
replacement surgery, may still game the system. They may initially pay the penalty, 
purchase insurance when they are ready to have their surgery, and then drop the 
insurance and pay the penalty again after their health care crisis passes.150 The choice 
of these otherwise healthy individuals to pay the penalty and then game the exchange 
system causes the exchanges to become heavily weighted with high-risk 
beneficiaries.151  
The ACA also uses three risk adjustment programs to prevent some insurers from 
cherry picking good risks, while other insurers get stuck with all of the high-risk 
enrollees, creating adverse selection problems.152 Two of the three risk adjustment 
programs are temporary. The first program applies in 2014, 2015, and 2016 and is a 
reinsurance program for insurers in the individual market.153 The program imposes 
assessments on insurers and administrators for self-insured plans, and then uses 
those funds as reinsurance for insurers who insure high-risk enrollees.154 
The second program also covers the years 2014 through 2016 in the form of a 
risk corridor program for exchange plans.155 The program sets a target amount for 
annual insurer claims costs and if an insurer’s claims costs come in under that 
amount by 3% or more, then the insurer must pay some of that money to the 
                                                                                                                                            
 146 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2010). 
 147 Monahan, supra note 138, at 788-91. 
 148 Id. at 792. 
 149 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010). 
 150 Epstein & Stannard, supra note 76, at 254 (criticizing burdensome ACA regulations for 
allowing healthy individuals to strategically enter and leave the exchange market, thereby 
driving adverse selection). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Baker, supra note 52, at 1614 (explaining that these programs shift funds between 
insurers, such that the enrollee is really paying his or her fair share of premiums as part of a 
larger pool of many insurers, rather than paying premiums based on the limited risk pool of 
that enrollee’s insurer). 
 153 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061 (West 2010). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. § 18062. 
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government.156 In turn, if an insurer’s claims costs are 103% of the target number or 
higher, then the government uses the money paid into the program to provide 
reinsurance to those insurers for those excess costs.157 
 The permanent risk adjustment program authorizes states to assess a charge 
against all individual and small group insurers, other than self-insured plans, who 
tend to have enrollees with a lower than average actuarial risk, and to shift those 
funds to individual and small group insurers, other than self-insured plans, who tend 
to have enrollees with higher than average actuarial risk.158 The program provides 
financial assistance for insurers who end up with high-risk enrollees, while 
penalizing those who would try to cherry pick low-risk beneficiaries. 
There are concerns that these three programs will not be effective. First, risk 
adjustment technology is new and tends to under-predict the costs of high-risk 
enrollees and over-predict the costs of low-risk enrollees.159 At best, risk adjustment 
programs only assist in reducing the cost differences between multiple plans, and in 
the case of the ACA risk adjustment programs, the ability to do so is weak, given the 
lack of existing data to compare the risks of beneficiaries across plans.160 
Second, assuming states cooperate in developing risk adjustment systems, they 
may have difficulty in collecting the data necessary to develop an effective risk 
adjustment system, especially the data needed from non-exchange insurers.161 
Moreover, insurers may have a hard time collecting data to assess risk for short-term 
beneficiaries, who are only on the exchange for a brief time period, as a result of job 
changes or Medicaid churning.162  
Third, insurers have demonstrated a history of evading risk adjustment programs 
and continuing to cherry pick good risks, while trying to stick other insurers with 
poor risks. For example, similar to the ACA exchange provisions, Part D includes 
protections against adverse selection, such as risk adjustment, reinsurance and risk 
corridors.163 Despite these preventive measures some Part D plans have been able to 
structure plan designs to lure in healthier, low-risk enrollees and drive away costlier, 
high-risk enrollees.164 A similar situation occurred with Medicare Advantage.165 
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 158 Id. § 18063(a). 
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There is no reason why the same thing would not occur with regard to the 
exchanges, except that adverse selection may occur not only among plans within the 
exchanges, but may also occur between insurers inside the exchange and insurers 
outside the exchange.166 
Insurance brokers may even assist insurers in evading the risk adjustment 
programs. Brokers make money off of commissions, so they will direct consumers to 
wherever their commissions are going to be highest.167 If a broker is not getting a 
commission or a sufficient commission from exchange business, then he or she will 
not direct business toward the exchange or will engage in “street underwriting” in 
which the broker moves high-cost business to the exchanges and low-cost business 
outside of the exchanges.168 There is a history of insurance brokers undermining 
insurance exchanges because of the lack of exchange commissions or poorly 
structured exchange commissions.169  
 Finally, the fact that premium subsidies and cost-sharing reductions for low-
income beneficiaries are only offered through the exchanges170 also appears to fight 
adverse selection. To the extent that these lower income beneficiaries are healthy and 
low-risk, the ACA subsidies encourage this group of healthy consumers to buy 
insurance through the individual exchanges, thereby promoting risk spreading.171 
However, if those who tend to qualify for these subsidies tend to fall more into the 
high-risk category, then the use of exchange-based subsidies only further 
incentivizes these high-risk individuals to migrate toward the individual exchanges, 
thereby driving up exchange costs.  
III. MANAGED CARE IN THE EXCHANGES 
A. Why and How Insurers Might Fight Back Against High Exchange Costs 
Adverse selection and high costs are very real and serious threats to the viability 
of the exchanges. The question and part of the focus of this article is what will be the 
response to these adverse selection and high cost concerns. Many have focused on 
possible federal and state government responses to save the exchanges from adverse 
selection and high costs.172 However, the focus of this article is on the insurer’s 
                                                                                                                                            
 165 Id. at 8 (explaining how Medicare Advantage plans upcoded enrollees’ health risk in 
order to qualify for high risk adjustment payments). 
 166 Westfall, supra note 39, at 118 (arguing that exchange insurers may engage in “cream 
skimming,” or competing for the healthiest enrollees, instead of competing on the basis of 
quality and efficiency). 
 167 Id. at 118. 
 168 Jost, supra note 46, at 52. 
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response, especially efforts to promote managed care and related cost cutting 
measures.  
The potential for adverse selection and high costs within the exchanges begs for 
insurers to take action to restrain such costs, assuming insurers see a potential 
profitable market in the individual exchanges and seek to tap into that market. While 
managed care may be unpopular with consumers and providers173 and may not be the 
panacea to resolve any and all cost problems in the individual exchanges, insurers 
will likely attempt to use managed care-type tools to address these cost problems. 
After all, managed care has a proven track record of controlling costs and decreasing 
spending, without having a negative impact on quality health care.174 As long as the 
individual exchange insurers adopt managed care tools, as a whole group, they avoid 
creating an adverse selection problem among themselves and may be able to repeat 
past managed care cost control successes.175  
While some maintain that managed care is dead as a result of State Patients Bill 
of Rights laws,176 such is not the case.177 Instead, managed care merely changed its 
form, such that it “broadened provider networks, reduced physician risk-sharing, 
introduced new incentives under the rubric of pay-for-performance, relaxed 
gatekeeping, and focused utilization review on high cost items.”178 Perhaps in 
                                                                                                                                            
enrollment-letter-to-e-benjamin-nelson-chairman-subcommittee-on-the-legislative-branch-
committee-on-appropriations-united-states-senate/oclc/716123472?referer=di&ht=edition 
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 173 Barbara J. Zabawa et al., Adopting Accountable Care Through the Medicare 
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Policy Making, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 237-39 (2005) (finding that the literary 
consensus is that managed care reduced the rate of health care cost growth without evidence 
of a clear negative impact on health care quality). 
 175 Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical 
Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 375-76 (2001) (noting that it is important that insurers 
collectively promote managed care or otherwise they create their own adverse selection 
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high-risk enrollees enroll in more traditional insurance plans). 
 176 Zabawa et al., supra note 173, at 1486-87 (detailing how State Patients Bill of Rights 
laws watered down managed care). 
 177 Marc A. Rodwin, The Metamorphosis of Managed Care: Implications for Health 
Reform Internationally, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 352, 359 (2010) (citing scholarly claims that 
managed care is dead, but declaring that the obituary is premature). 
 178 Id. 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/5
2014] IT’S A MISTAKE  99 
 
response to the provider and patient backlash against utilization management and 
review, capitation and gatekeeping, MCOs became more sophisticated, subtle, and 
less blunt in their efforts to control costs, but they still engaged in such efforts.179 
These revised MCOs still successfully found ways to reduce costs and improve the 
quality of care, despite obstacles from the managed care backlash of the 1990s.180 
Moreover, managed care is alive and well today in many different contexts. Of 
those receiving employment based insurance, 16% are still enrolled in HMOs, with 
another 65% enrolled in revised forms of managed care, either preferred provider 
organizations (“PPOs”) or point of service (“POS”) plans.181 Managed care is 
thriving and growing even more in the Medicaid world, where, as of 2011, over 74% 
of Medicaid enrollees were enrolled in managed care plans in the United States.182 
Likewise, in Medicare, in 2012, 27% of all Medicare enrollees were enrolled in 
Medicare Part C, the managed care version of Medicare.183 
B. Managed Care’s Perseverance and New Tools for Controlling Costs in the 
Exchanges 
Insurer managed care efforts will certainly face obstacles within the exchanges. 
For example, the exchange-based network adequacy requirement184 will interfere 
with insurers’ ability to develop restricted networks. Likewise, the ACA requirement 
that group health plans and insurers offer extensive internal and external grievance 
reviews185 also hinders the ability of insurers to engage in strict utilization 
management and review.  
Nonetheless, managed care has demonstrated a history of perseverance and 
survival despite obstacles. In the past, managed care revamped its tools to achieve 
cost cutting goals in new ways. As discussed supra, managed care found ways to 
avoid risk adjustment measures in Medicare Parts C and D. Managed care also 
extorted loopholes in statutes and regulations, such as State laws that restrict 
capitation, but fail to precisely define what capitation is prohibited.186  
                                                                                                                                            
 179 Linda Peeno, The Second Coming of Managed Care, 40-MAY TRIAL 18 (2004) 
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POL’Y & L. 427, 434 (2005) (finding that few states implemented guidelines regarding what 
sort of capitation agreements are prohibited and only one state took any enforcement actions 
against managed care insurers). 
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Moreover, some of the ACA’s anti-managed care provisions are not as strong as 
they may seem. For example, the ACA’s external review requirement may not have 
much teeth. Under ERISA, courts grant insurers a highly deferential standard of 
review when the ERISA plan design grants the plan great discretion in its coverage 
decisions.187 The same thing could happen with the ACA internal and external 
grievance requirements. 
At this early stage in the development of exchanges, it is difficult to predict how 
insurers will attempt to control costs within the health insurance exchanges, but one 
possibility is to promote or facilitate the growth of ACA endorsed delivery reform 
measures that mirror managed care.188 For example, the Medicare Accountable Care 
Organization (“ACO”) demonstration project calls for the creation of ACO entities 
comprised of providers and hospitals that are held jointly accountable for delivering 
low cost and high quality care to their Medicare patients.189 The ACO providers still 
get paid on a fee-for-service basis, but, depending on the ACO model chosen, 
Medicare will pay the ACO bonuses and levy penalties against them based on their 
ability to reduce Medicare spending while maintaining or improving care quality.190 
Unlike traditional managed care, the cost accountability and risk falls upon the 
providers instead of the insurers, but, the payer, through setting cost and quality 
standards, is still indirectly managing spending, managing care, and eliminating 
wasteful and unnecessary care.191 The similarity between ACOs and managed care is 
even closer where the ACO operates under a fully capitated system.192 ACOs are 
already growing like gangbusters, especially in the private sector.193 
Somewhat similar to the ACOs, the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement 
Initiative uses a quasi-capitated payment system to incentivize providers to cut costs 
and deliver high quality care.194 Though there are different bundled payment models, 
the general approach is for Medicare and a group of providers to set a target bundled 
cost for all of the care associated with an episode of care surrounding a given 
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hospitalization.195 The providers involved in that episode of care will continue to be 
paid by Medicare on a fee-for-service basis, but their total reimbursement will be 
measured against the target costs.196 If they generate savings against the targeted 
costs, they share in those savings, but if they generate losses, then they must repay 
some of their reimbursement to Medicare.197 The system is very much like a 
managed care capitated payment system198 with one of the bundled payment models 
being fully capitated.199  
The Patient-Centered Medical Home takes on a different aspect of managed care, 
the gatekeeper-like role of primary care providers.200 Under the PCMH or Advanced 
Primary Care Practice (“APCP”) demo, Medicare will pay primary care providers an 
additional fee to coordinate a patient’s care with other providers, manage the 
patient’s overall health, monitor the patient’s health, and provide general oversight 
over the patient over the continuum of care.201 Although patients in the APCP 
program are not required to obtain the primary care provider’s permission to see 
specialists, the primary care provider is still financially incentivized to regulate, 
monitor, control, and oversee the patient’s complete care. Many large private 
insurers are already testing medical home models outside of Medicare.202 
Initially, insurers may be forced to use incentives to promote the spread of these 
reforms until these delivery reforms fully expand beyond Medicare and Medicaid 
demo programs and reach a tipping point of acceptance. However, eventually, 
assuming network adequacy requirements are met, exchange insurers may require 
that contracting providers agree to operate as ACOs, PCMHs, or be willing to accept 
bundled payments in order to be providers within the insurer’s network. The 
question is whether insurers can use these new models and other managed care-type 
tools to cut costs effectively or whether they will be stymied in their efforts. 
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IV. ERISA PREEMPTION AND THE EXCHANGES 
A. Managed Care Tort Liability 
Beyond the consumer protection obstacles embodied within state-based Patients 
Bill of Rights laws and certain ACA provisions, such as the network adequacy 
requirements and internal/external grievance process requirements, the lack of 
ERISA preemption for individual exchange insurers poses another difficult obstacle 
for managed care and cost cutting efforts within the individual exchanges. 
Historically, when insurers adopt aggressive cost cutting measures that result in 
patient injury, patients have tried to sue their insurer under State tort law 
principles.203 More specifically, patients have sued their insurers successfully under 
a variety of liability theories, including apparent agency,204 actual agency,205 and 
corporate negligence.206  
A well-known example of the application of apparent and actual agency liability 
to a managed care organization (“MCO”) is Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of 
Illinois, Inc.207 In Petrovich, the plaintiff sued various treating doctors and her HMO 
for medical malpractice after her doctors negligently failed to diagnose her oral 
cancer.208 Although the doctors were independent contractors of the HMO, the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that the HMO could be held liable for the doctors’ 
medical malpractice, provided the HMO held itself out as the provider of care 
without informing the patient that she was receiving care from an independent 
contractor doctor and provided the patient was seeking care from the HMO and not a 
specific doctor.209 The Court further held that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the HMO exerted sufficient control over the doctors involved to 
                                                                                                                                            
 203 Christopher Smith, Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Physicians and the Clash of 
Liability Standards and Cost Cutting Goals Within Accountable Care Organizations, 20 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 165, 174-75 (2011). 
 204 E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from 
Tort & Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2006) (noting that as managed care exerted 
more control over financial and medical decisions for patients, they were more subject to 
liability through corporate negligence and ostensible authority theories). 
 205 Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What if You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care 
Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 244 (2003) (noting that States 
expanded the reach of implied authority liability to MCOs where there was sufficient control 
of affiliated independent contractor doctors). 
 206 Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Application of the Corporate Negligence Doctrine to 
Managed Care Organizations: Sound Public Policy or Judicial Overkill?, 17 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 585, 613 (2001) (noting that staff model MCOs, like hospitals, have the 
same duty to select and retain competent healthcare providers, to maintain safe and adequate 
facilities and equipment for enrollees when the MCOs provide direct medical care, to oversee 
all who practice under their influence and control and to ensure that enrolled providers 
formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules to ensure quality care). 
 207 Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill.1999). 
 208 Id. at 760. 
 209 Id. at 768. 
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create an actual agency relationship, given the HMO’s capitation method for paying 
the doctors and its quality assurance review over the doctors.210 
An example of corporate negligence in the MCO context is Jones v. Chicago 
HMO, in which an overburdened HMO staff doctor was unavailable to personally 
examine a sick child and negligently failed to diagnose and treat the child’s 
meningitis.211 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the HMO could be held liable for 
the child’s resulting brain damage through corporate negligence.212 The Court ruled 
that the plaintiff could prevail on a corporate negligence theory by proving that the 
HMO assigned an excessive number of patients to the HMO staff doctor, thereby 
overburdening the provider and indirectly resulting in the patient’s injury.213  
B. ERISA Preemption of State Tort Suits Against Managed Care 
Despite plaintiffs’ general success in suing HMOs under various tort doctrines, 
when a plaintiff sues his employment-based MCO for cost cutting that leads to 
patient harm, ERISA preemption of state tort law prohibits such plaintiffs from 
recovering from their insurer.214 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA, as 
applied to employment-based health plans, has rendered almost all such plans 
immune from state tort suits.215 Accordingly, ERISA preemption has an impact on a 
large number of potential plaintiffs, as presently, almost sixty percent of non-elderly 
Americans receive their health insurance through their employers.216  
ERISA was passed in 1974 with the goal of providing uniform federal regulation 
of employee welfare and benefits plans, so that large employers were not subject to 
the vagaries of fifty different state welfare and benefits laws.217 Hence the strong 
federal preemption measures within ERISA, which are twofold in nature. First, 
                                                                                                                                            
 210 Id. at 774-75. 
 211 Jones v. Chi. HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (Ill. 2000).  
 212 Id. at 1128.  
 213 Id. at 1132; see also Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that 
corporate negligence principles apply to HMOs where an HMO influences the delivery of 
health care and attempts to limit patient access to treatment). 
 214 Peter Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
365, 381 (2003) (noting the generally unsuccessful patient State law challenges against 
ERISA plans for injury due to delayed or denied care or MCO financial incentives to 
providers to limit care). 
 215 Schapiro, supra note 2, at 46-47 (noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA 
to preempt State law claims against HMOs without providing a federal substitute remedy). 
 216 JULIE SONIER ET AL., STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR., STATE LEVEL 
TRENDS IN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3 (Apr. 
2013), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/rwjf405434 
(finding that 59.5% of non-elderly Americans had employer-sponsored coverage in 2010 and 
2011). 
 217 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 
(1990) (holding that the purpose of ERISA was “to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would 
be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and 
financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and 
the Federal Government”).  
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Section 514 of ERISA supersedes any state law that relates to employee benefit 
plans.218 However, Section 514 preemption is not complete as the “savings” clause 
of Section 514 saves from federal preemption any state law that regulates 
insurance.219 In other words, if a state law relates to employee benefit plans, but is 
also a regulation of insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. 
Nonetheless, even a “saved” state law, as applied to self-insured plans, is further 
preempted by ERISA through the “deemer clause” of Section 514.220 The “deemer 
clause” deems self-insured plans to be preempt from any and all state laws regulating 
employee benefits, even if the applicable law also regulates insurance.221 
Second, even if Section 514 does not preempt a given state law, Section 502 of 
ERISA may still preempt the state law at issue. With regard to a wrongful denial of 
benefits, Section 502 provides for exclusive ERISA federal causes of action against 
an ERISA plan fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the plan and for 
other appropriate equitable relief.222 The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
provision to fall under the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, meaning that Section 502 completely preempts any well-pleaded 
state law cause of action that duplicates, supplements or supplants the Section 502 
ERISA remedial scheme.223 
The Supreme Court decision in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila provides the 
definitive interpretation of Section 514 complete preemption in relation to 
employment-based health insurance plans. In Davila, two plaintiffs, in separate, but 
consolidated cases, sued their insurers for rejecting their respective doctors’ 
recommendations related to coverage for an arthritis drug and an extended hospital 
stay following surgery, respectively.224 The plaintiffs sought recovery under a Texas 
statute that provided for a state law cause of action against a health insurer who 
violates its duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment 
decisions.225  
The Supreme Court held that the state law claims were completely preempted by 
ERISA Section 502 because the state law claims were really claims for wrongfully 
denied benefits and were not claims alleging violation of a legal duty independent of 
ERISA.226 The Court further held that ERISA preempted the state law claims 
because the state law claims supplemented the ERISA remedies with additional tort-
like remedies.227 Accordingly, the nature of the state law claims were for a denial of 
                                                                                                                                            
 218 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
 219 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 220 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at § 1132(a). 
 223 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207-09 (2004). 
 224 Id. at 204-05. 
 225 Id. at 205. 
 226 Id. at 214. 
 227 Id. at 214-16. 
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benefits, fell within the scope of ERISA and were completely preempted by ERISA 
Section 502.228 
Given the ERISA statute and Davila, it appears that injured patients have few, if 
any, state law tort claims against their employment-based insurers when the insurer’s 
actions proximately cause the patient’s injury.229 Justice Ginsburg’s concurring 
opinion, in Davila, referenced a regulatory vacuum created by ERISA as to claims 
against ERISA plans, whereby “[v]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but 
very few federal substitutes are provided.”230 Available remedies are limited to the 
value of wrongfully denied benefits,231 breach of fiduciary duty damages, where the 
fiduciary’s actions result in a loss to the plan or a gain to the fiduciary232 and other 
equitable relief.233 However, the breach of fiduciary duty damages are only available 
to the plan itself, not the plan beneficiary.234 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the equitable relief provision to narrowly include only the value of 
wrongfully denied benefits.235 In the end, the beneficiary, in an ERISA action against 
his or her insurer, is limited to recovery for the value of wrongfully denied benefits 
and there are no ERISA consequential or punitive damages available.236 
 ERISA plan insurers obviously benefit from the veritable immunity that they 
receive from state tort law.237 Providers and patients, on the other hand, are not so 
                                                                                                                                            
 228 Id. at 221. 
 229 But see id. at 218-21 (interpreting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), as holding 
that ERISA does not preempt State law claims against physician owned HMOs, where the 
conduct at issue involves a mixed treatment and eligibility decision and not just a plan 
fiduciary eligibility decision); Badal v. Hinsdale Mem’l Hosp., 2007 WL 1424205 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (holding that ERISA did not preempt claim against employment-based insurer where 
plaintiff was not complaining of wrongfully denied benefits, but was seeking to hold the 
insurer vicariously liable for his physician’s negligence in misdiagnosing an ankle injury); 
Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (Tex. 224th Dist. Ct., Bexar Cnty. June 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.crowell.com/pdf/managedcare/Smelik.pdf (jury verdict against 
employment-based HMO for mismanaged care instead of denial of benefits). 
 230 Davila, 542 U.S. at 222. 
 231 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (West 2013); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 
134, 148 (1985) (holding that ERISA does not allow for extracontractual damages). 
 232 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(2) (West 2013). 
 233 Id. § 1132(a)(3). 
 234 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 254 (2008) (holding that only the 
ERISA plan, not the beneficiary, can recover damages for breach of an ERISA fiduciary 
duty). 
 235 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-18 (2001) 
(narrowly interpreting ERISA’s equitable relief provision). 
 236 Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, & Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the 
Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387, 394-95 (2009). 
 237 Duncan MacCourt & Joseph Bernstein, Medical Error Reduction & Tort Reform 
Through Private, Contractually-Based Quality Medicine Societies, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 505, 
519 (2009) (explaining that ERISA plans highly value the benefits of ERISA preemption 
while placing the entire liability for medical malpractice squarely on the shoulders of 
providers).  
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welcoming of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA preemption. The patient 
can still sue his or her provider for medical malpractice, but he or she is effectively 
denied access to the deep pockets of the insurer.238  
ERISA preemption places providers in an even more uncompromising position. 
ERISA plans can impose cost cutting measures on or incentivize providers to adopt 
cost cutting measures without concern for any negative outcomes to the plan itself 
because the ERISA plan is unlikely to be held liable for any resulting patient 
injury.239 Providers, however, are stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one 
hand, providers must implement such cost cutting measures or face termination from 
the MCO provider network and loss of their patient base.240 On the other hand, 
providers also have an ethical duty to provide all necessary care to their patients, 
regardless of cost,241 and face potential malpractice liability if they cut beneficial 
care.242 Because of ERISA preemption of ERISA plan state tort liability, providers 
must implement the MCO cost cutting measures, while at the same time shouldering 
all of the liability burden.243Accordingly, ERISA preemption removes the specter of 
medical malpractice liability as an obstacle to ERISA plan cost cutting measures, 
albeit at the expense of patients and providers. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are much less 
willing to sue ERISA plans when their actions are connected to patient injury, 
especially given that the health care provider is still an available pocket for 
compensation.244 Without question, ERISA plans can much more easily control costs 
with ERISA preemption than without it. Given the significance of ERISA 
preemption to insurers’ ability to engage in cost control, the question is how this 
ERISA preemption dynamic will play out in the health insurance exchanges, if and 
when insurers attempt to use managed care-type tools control the anticipated high 
exchange costs and avoid adverse selection. 
                                                                                                                                            
 238 Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting) 
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Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1932 (2003) (arguing that ERISA 
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32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/5
2014] IT’S A MISTAKE  107 
 
C. The Lack of ERISA Preemption in the Individual Insurance Exchanges 
Although ERISA preemption will still apply to employment-based insurers 
within the SHOP exchanges, it will not protect individual exchange plans from state 
tort suits, where their cost-cutting measures proximately cause patient injury. 
Because ERISA only governs employee benefit plans and because individual 
exchange plans are not connected to employment, there is no ERISA protection for 
such plans. The result is a “tale of two” insurer markets, in which self-insured and 
fully-insured employment plans, inside or outside of the exchanges, will be protected 
by ERISA from potential state tort claims, but not so with regard to individual 
exchange plans.  
The lack of ERISA preemption for individual exchange plans poses serious 
concerns for those insurers who wish to engage in cost-cutting and use managed 
care-type tools to combat the likely high costs within the exchanges. The threat of 
tort liability against individual exchange insurers may overly deter them from 
engaging in beneficial managed care cost cutting.245 Not all managed care cost 
cutting is bad; historically, there is support for the argument that managed care can 
cut wasteful spending without harming patient quality.246 However, the threat of 
liability does not discriminate and will deter all cost cutting, both good and bad.247 
As a consequence, individual insurers, without ERISA protection, may entirely 
abandon managed care and cost-cutting efforts within the individual exchanges.248 
Without those cost-cutting measures, insurers are unable to target wasteful spending 
and the adverse selection and high cost problems likely to impact the individual 
exchanges will remain unabated and will grow. 
The threat of insurer liability could lead to a phenomenon akin to doctors who 
practice defensive medicine.249 Physicians who engage in defensive medicine 
provide excessive or unnecessary care or tests, or avoid risky patients or treatments 
because they fear that skimping on care or caring for risky patients might expose 
                                                                                                                                            
 245 Katherine L. Record, Note, Wielding the Wand Without Facing the Music: Allowing 
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 248 Id. at 262 (arguing that “the specter of tort liability could chill innovation in techniques 
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them to unpredictable tort liability.250 Similarly, within the context of the individual 
exchanges, shifting or expanding the risk of liability away from the health care 
provider and onto the insurer raises concerns that individual exchange insurers will 
engage in an analogous form of defensive medicine-type behavior. Fearing liability, 
such insurers may remove beneficial cost constraints aimed at cutting waste, remove 
provider incentives that reduce wasteful spending, and approve wasteful and 
unnecessary medical claims. However, the failure to eliminate wasteful care only 
raises the overall cost of care, which will likely be passed along to exchange 
beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums. If the threat of insurer tort liability 
within the individual exchanges is too great and the costs to provide individual 
insurance are too high, then insurers may go further than engaging in defensive 
medicine-type behavior and might entirely abandon the individual exchanges.251 
Given that fully-insured or self-insured employment plans are shielded from state 
tort liability by ERISA and given that those markets are large insurance markets,252 
individual insurers have even less reason to work hard to make the individual 
exchanges function effectively. If costs get out of hand within the individual 
exchanges, insurers can just leave the individual exchanges and focus their efforts on 
employment-based insurance. Unfortunately, an exodus of insurers from the 
individual exchanges could ultimately lead to the collapse of the exchanges. 
Even if insurers do not drop out of the insurance exchanges, their potential tort 
liability may cause insurance premiums within the exchange to rise. There are 
significant costs for insurers in defending against beneficiary tort suits and insurers 
tend to settle such suits early on, even if the insurer is probably not at fault.253 
Accordingly, at least some of these costs are not even attributable to valid tort 
claims. Yet, insurers are likely to pass these litigation and settlement costs along to 
enrollees in the form of higher premiums. By contrast, with ERISA preemption, 
there are fewer state tort claims against insurers, which means lower litigation and 
settlement costs.254 Hence, ERISA plan insurers need not be concerned with passing 
along litigation and settlement costs to their beneficiaries. 
Beyond the practical negative impacts of subjecting insurers to potential tort 
liability, imposing medical malpractice liability on insurers may be bad policy. 
Arguably, injured patients already have a source of recovery for medical malpractice 
injuries via their doctors and their doctors’ medical malpractice insurer.255 Imposing 
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liability upon the insurer is duplicative and merely adds unnecessary costs onto the 
health care system.256 
Individual exchange beneficiaries and health care providers would probably 
disagree with these arguments. On the surface, under the status quo, individual 
exchange beneficiaries who are injured by insurer cost cutting would welcome the 
ability to hold their insurers accountable. Some argue that “there is some reason to 
believe that managed care organizations are better positioned to process liability 
signals than are individual clinicians…[since] managed care organizations are in the 
business of spreading risk, and, with time and experience, should be more able to 
gauge their response to the increased risk of liability.”257 Moreover, injured 
beneficiaries would view the insurer as the true locus of responsibility, at least where 
the health care provider correctly claims that the patient harm was the direct or 
indirect result of managed care cost cutting and not the provider’s independent 
medical judgment or skill. For the injured beneficiary, the insurer serves as another 
deep pocket for recovery and a deeper pocket than the health care provider.258 The 
insurer may be seen as an easier target than the provider in the vein of the “big bad 
insurance company” in contrast to the kind doctor who is devoted to his community.  
While on the surface the lack of ERISA preemption may seem like a good thing 
for exchange beneficiaries, a deeper dive reveals that beneficiaries will see negative 
impacts in the long run. As discussed supra, increased insurer liability can lead to 
increased costs. Insurers will not eat these costs; they will pass them along to 
individual exchange beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums.259 In fact, the 
trickle down costs may be quite high, as compared to physicians, insurers are more 
likely to be subject to larger awards and/or punitive damages awards.260 Exchange 
beneficiaries will suffer the consequences of increased insurer liability as much as 
they enjoy the benefits thereof. In fact, if individual exchange insurers are also 
providing insurance in other ERISA regulated markets, they may pass along the 
increased exchange-based litigation costs to all of their beneficiaries, and not just the 
ones in the individual exchanges.  
Unlike beneficiaries, providers probably have less to lose from increased insurer 
liability in the individual exchanges. With the potential for insurer liability for 
medical malpractice, providers no longer have to bear the liability burden alone.261 
They will no longer be stuck in the middle between insurer cost cutting pressures, on 
one side, and the threat of medical malpractice liability if they cut beneficial care; 
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the insurer will have to share the burden, as well. In fact, if the insurer is found to be 
more at fault for the patient’s injury, the provider may be able to shift a greater 
portion of the liability costs to the insurer through contribution and joint and several 
liability.262 
Nonetheless, even providers could face a couple of potential downsides to 
increased individual exchange insurer liability. First, if individual exchange insurers 
face higher costs due to litigation, they could put pressure on providers to accept 
reimbursement cuts, as a way to offset the higher costs. Second, if insurer liability 
ultimately leads to insurers abandoning the exchanges, then many individual 
exchange beneficiaries will lose coverage and providers’ covered patient population 
will shrink. While insured patients provide a steady stream of income for providers, 
there is less stability with regard to patients who cannot obtain insurance and must 
pay out-of-pocket.263 An increase in uninsured patients would force providers to 
absorb some of the costs of caring for the uninsured population and pass those costs 
along to health care insurers and their beneficiaries.264  
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE INDIVIDUAL EXCHANGE ERISA PROBLEM 
A. Altering the Scope of ERISA Preemption 
The lack of ERISA preemption within the individual exchanges plainly poses 
problems in terms of the ability of individual exchange insurers to engage in 
beneficial cost cutting and the potential for insurer tort liability to lead to high prices 
within the exchanges. There are various solutions to addressing the ERISA problem, 
but this article focuses on the creation of a no-fault insurer liability system. Such a 
proposal both protects insurers against catastrophic tort damages for harmful cost 
cutting and provides injured beneficiaries with some form of remedy when they are 
injured by insurer cost cutting. An alternative to the no-fault solution is to 
legislatively eliminate ERISA preemption for all insurers, thereby leveling the 
ERISA preemption playing field between individual exchange insurers and 
employment-based insurers. Some would argue that ERISA preemption relies too 
much on the competitive market to regulate insurers’ abusive cost cutting tactics.265 
In the employment context, employers’ information costs are too great in isolating 
and avoiding the abusive insurers and it is far from clear whether employers can pass 
these costs along to their employees, so that employees will choose their employer 
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based on the quality of that employer’s insurers or the strength of that employer’s 
efforts to combat insurer abuses.266 
Elimination of ERISA preemption, across-the-board, and the specter of tort 
liability would certainly discourage insurers from engaging in cost cutting measures 
that negatively impact quality. It would also equitably ensure that insurers, and not 
just providers, are held accountable for cost cutting that harms patients. Moreover, 
all patients—not just those purchasing insurance from the individual exchanges—
would have an additional deep pocket remedy source for their injury or harm. 
Finally, treating all insurers the same avoids a scenario under which insurers would 
avoid providing insurance through the exchanges and seek to provide insurance 
solely in the employment context in order to maximize their ERISA-based immunity 
from tort suits. 
Despite the benefits of this solution, there are a number of problems. First, as 
discussed supra, the specter of potential tort liability could over deter insurer cost 
cutting, such that all insurers would refuse to engage in beneficial cost cutting, or 
cost cutting that eliminates waste from the health care system without causing harm 
to beneficiaries.267 Second, open ended tort liability could drive up insurance costs 
throughout the industry.268 All insurers might raise premiums to account for potential 
catastrophic tort damages, passing along the costs to beneficiaries and their 
employers. Third, the elimination of ERISA preemption is not politically feasible. 
ERISA preemption has withstood the test of time for forty years and history 
demonstrates that the insurance industry will not allow its repeal.269  
Some argue that the Department of Labor (“DOL”) should give teeth to the 
ERISA “equitable relief” remedy, such that ERISA plans would face real liability for 
cost cutting that results in patient injury. The DOL could use its regulatory authority 
to define the “equitable relief” provision of ERISA to include damages for patient 
injuries, in addition to any wrongfully denied benefits.270 Alternatively, the DOL 
could monitor employment-based insurers and impose penalties on those who 
abusively engage in cost cutting that leads to patient harm.271 However, these 
solutions are not much different than eliminating ERISA preemption across-the-
board and carry with them the same problems.  
An alternative solution is the opposite extreme. Instead of eliminating ERISA 
preemption, Congress could expand ERISA preemption to include individual 
                                                                                                                                            
 266 Id. at 2352-55 (arguing that employers are incentivized to do what is cheapest, not best 
in terms of picking health insurers for their employees). 
 267 Robert F. Rich, The Two Faces of Managed Care Regulation & Policymaking, 16 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 272-73 (2005) (noting that insurers argue that MCO liability hinders the 
ability of MCOs to improve patient quality). 
 268 Id. (noting that insurers argue that MCO liability increases the costs of managed care). 
 269 Roderick M. Hills Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2007) (outlining repeated failures to repeal 
ERISA preemption throughout the 1990s due to massive public relations efforts by MCOs). 
Technically, ERISA preemption, as it is recognized today, is rooted in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, but the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse course, so a legislative reversal 
would likely be necessary.  
 270 Moncrieff, Assault on Litigation, supra note 265, at 2341-42. 
 271 Id. at 2342-43. 
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exchange insurers. Such a move would eliminate any disincentive for insurers to 
avoid the individual exchanges for fear of tort liability. Moreover, such tort 
immunity would allow individual exchange insurers to engage more freely in cost 
cutting measures and more effectively fight high costs within the exchanges.272 As a 
consequence, premiums would be less likely to skyrocket due to the threat of insurer 
liability and insurers feeling hamstringed from engaging in cost cutting. 
In the end, complete ERISA preemption across-the-board is no better than 
complete elimination of ERISA preemption. With universal ERISA preemption in 
place, individual exchange insurers, as is currently the case with non-exchange 
insurers, would not be held accountable when they engage in cost cutting that results 
in patient injury. Although the individual insurance exchanges impose quality 
regulations on the individual exchange insurers,273 the fear remains that the lack of a 
tort deterrent would allow individual exchange insurers to engage in cost cutting that 
has a negative impact on patient quality. 
Politically, patients and providers would strongly oppose such a policy solution. 
Under the status quo individual exchange beneficiaries will be able to sue their 
insurers for harmful cost cutting. Expanding ERISA preemption asks them to forego 
this tort remedy. If ERISA preemption is expanded, injured beneficiaries are left 
with a sole remedy against their physician, who may not be at fault for the injury. 
Likewise, providers would also oppose changing the status quo. Providers do not 
want to shoulder the entire burden of liability, as they do in the ERISA context. 
Accordingly, as much as the repeal of ERISA preemption across-the-board is dead 
on arrival, so is the policy solution of ERISA preemption expansion.274 
B. A No-Fault Compensation System Solution 
1. Why a No-Fault Compensation System is a Good Solution 
The best solution to the ERISA problem in the individual exchanges may be a 
middle ground solution. Such a solution needs to balance the interests at issue. 
Insurers need to have some level of accountability for harmful cost cutting, while not 
being subjected to open-ended and possibly catastrophic tort liability. At the same 
time, physicians should not bear the burden of tort liability, when insurers are 
partially or fully at fault for the resulting harm. Moreover, patients should have 
access to sufficient remedies when they are injured by insurer cost cutting measures. 
Accordingly, a better solution than the all or nothing solutions, outlined supra, is 
to create a no-fault compensation fund as a limited tort remedy against individual 
exchange insurers, when they engage in cost cutting measures that lead to patient 
harm. For many years, scholars have floated this idea as an entire replacement for 
the medical malpractice tort system.275 Within the health law world, the no-fault 
                                                                                                                                            
 272 Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court & Health Law: The Year in 
Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528, 531 (2004) (describing the Davila ERISA preemption of 
state tort law as allowing employers to more effectively cut health care costs). 
 273 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1) (West 2012).  
 274 See Hills, supra note 269, at 53 (arguing that the ERISA preemption immunity created 
through Supreme Court decisions would never win a majority vote in Congress). 
 275 See Paul J. Barringer et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy 
Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 725, 728 (2008); Eleanor D. Kinney, 
Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointment, Future Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. 
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concept has even been implemented in several limited situations. Congress enacted a 
no-fault system for childhood vaccination injuries through the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act (“NVIC”).276 Virginia and Florida also implemented a no-fault 
system for medical malpractice connected to birth injuries.277 
The general overview of any no-fault compensation system is an administrative 
system versus a court-based litigation system, which provides predictable 
compensation in a less expensive and more expedient manner than litigation.278 The 
victim need not show fault,279 but need only show that his or her injury falls within 
the confines of the no-fault system, or that a triggering no-fault event occurred.280 
The plaintiff is often limited to recovering only compensatory damages, usually as a 
percentage of his or her actual economic loss, and usually excluding pain and 
suffering.281  
No-fault compensation schemes generally have three goals. First, such schemes 
socialize the risk, compensating as many injured individuals as possible, spreading 
the burden of the damages across many actors and over time.282 Accordingly, a 
larger percentage of payouts go to deserving victims, in contrast to the tort system, 
which absorbs some of the funds in the form of transactional costs.283 Second, no-
fault systems aim to limit the liability of the tortfeasor and provide the tortfeasor 
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 276 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-10-25 (West 2012). 
 277 See Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, FLA. STAT. 
§§ 766.301-316 (2010); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (2007). 
 278 See Sagir Mor & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Relational Malpractice, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 601, 625 (2012) (proposing a no-fault system for medical malpractice claims with a 
focus on improving the doctor-patient relationship). 
 279 See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins & Economic Structure of Workers’ 
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800 (1982). 
 280 See Joseph H. King Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee’s Workers’ Compensation 
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 405, 406 (1998); Mor & Rabinovich-Einy, 
supra note 278, at 625. 
 281 See King, supra note 280, at 407. 
 282 See Donald G. Gifford et al., A Case Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach 
to Statutory Interpretation: Brueswitz v. Wyeth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221, 247-248 (2012) 
(explaining that one of the purposes of no-fault compensation schemes is to ensure that more 
people are compensated than through the traditional tort system); Marc A. Rodwin, French 
Medical Malpractice Law & Policy Through American Eyes: What It Reflects About Public 
and Private Aspects of American Law, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 109, 135 (2011). 
 283 See Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering From Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate 
Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 45-46 (2012) (touting the benefits of a 
no-fault system for injured research participants compared to the remedies available to them 
through the existing tort system); Rodwin, supra note 282, at 137 (noting that “studies show 
that malpractice litigation does not compensate most individuals injured due to negligence; 
furthermore, it holds parties liable for bad outcomes not caused by negligence”). 
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with predictable liability exposure.284 This is important for tortfeasors who might 
otherwise abandon their product or industry due to the possibility of open-ended 
catastrophic tort damages. Third, no-fault systems seek to reduce the transactional 
costs spent to obtain a remedy and speed up the recovery process in contrast to the 
high transactional costs and slowness of the traditional tort system.285 Generally, the 
overall compensation is lower, but it is seen as a tradeoff, providing more 
predictability and more compensation to more injured parties in exchange for 
avoiding the expensive, unpredictable and complex tort system.286 
A no-fault system is fitting for insurer liability within the insurance exchanges 
because it splits the baby. Beneficiaries injured by insurer cost cutting can quickly 
and easily obtain some form of recovery through the fund, while insurers need not 
worry that catastrophic tort suits by injured beneficiaries could drive them into 
bankruptcy.287 Predictability benefits both the injured beneficiary and the insurers. 
For beneficiaries, a no-fault system has advantages over the existing tort system, 
which is criticized for unpredictably overcompensating a few injured plaintiffs, 
while at the same time undercompensating or failing to compensate many plaintiffs 
with valid injuries.288 Insurers, on the other hand, benefit from the predictability 
because the potential for catastrophic liability awards might otherwise drive insurers 
out of the individual exchange market, prevent them from entering the market or 
drive up costs and premiums within the individual exchange market. A no-fault 
system is also fitting for insurer liability within the individual exchanges, as such 
systems are very useful in situations where it is difficult to prove causation.289 In the 
insurer liability context, it is not necessarily easy to demonstrate that an insurer cost 
cutting measure caused an individual’s injury versus poor healthcare provider 
decision-making or judgment, or pure malpractice on the part of the healthcare 
provider.  
Additionally, the timing for a no-fault system may be appropriate as a no-fault 
system is in alignment with the philosophy of the ACA.290 The ACA is very much 
                                                                                                                                            
 284 See Gifford et al., supra note 282, at 249 (arguing that the existing tort system leads to 
unpredictable catastrophic awards that can cripple a business or drive up liability insurance 
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 285 See Pike, supra note 283, at 45-46. 
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grounded on the concept of cost spreading.291 The ACA seeks to spread the cost of 
health care across as much of the population as possible, through the individual 
mandate, insurance exchange subsidies, the Medicaid expansion, and the insurance 
exchanges. A no-fault system would track the ACA philosophy with an emphasis on 
spreading the cost of insurer-induced injuries.  
A no-fault proposal in this limited context may also be timely because of the 
raging emotional debate over medical malpractice tort reform. When the excesses 
and limits of the tort system combine to reach a certain boiling point, historically, 
there has been greater success in enacting no-fault systems.292 Such a tipping point 
may be at hand with regard to issues related to medical malpractice, and insurer cost 
cutting measures that lead to patient harm are part and parcel of medical malpractice. 
On one side, tort reformers passionately argue that defensive medicine is costing 
billions of dollars annually and that tort liability is causing some providers to leave 
certain specialties or limit services, producing severe access problems for patients.293 
At the same time, the opposition to tort reform tugs at the heart strings and rails 
against existing tort reform measures for their limitations and failure to provide 
compensation to legitimately injured patients, as illustrated in the movie Hot 
Coffee.294  
2. Structuring the Insurer No-Fault Liability Fund and the Compensable Event 
Having established the rationale and timing for a no-fault system, the next issue 
is how to construct one. This article envisions an administrative system modeled 
primarily after the NVIC system. Accordingly, what follows is a brief outline of the 
elements of the NVIC that are pertinent to the proposed insurer no-fault system.  
Congress created the NVIC in 1986 as a federal no-fault compensation system 
for childhood vaccination injuries, after large damage awards against vaccine 
manufacturers raised concerns that they would stop manufacturing vaccines and 
would leave the market.295 Under the NVIC system, an injured claimant files a claim 
with the United States Court of Federal Claims, which refers the claim to a Special 
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 291 See Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning Employee Health Incentives-Lessons from 
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 292 See Engstrom, supra note 290, at 359 (arguing that impatience with the limitations and 
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 293 See Amy T. Campbell, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Frame the Role of Emotion 
in Health Policymaking, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 675, 681-82 (2012) (discussing how emotion is 
driving policymaking in the context of medical malpractice reform). 
 294 See id. at 682; HOT COFFEE (HBO Documentary Films 2011).  
 295 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION: PROGRAM 
CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY & EASILY 1, 4 (Dec. 1999), avalable at http://www. 
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Master.296 If the claimant’s injury is identified on a vaccine injury table, which links 
specific vaccines to specific injuries, then the claimant is entitled to a presumption of 
causation.297 The HHS Secretary serves as the Respondent and can rebut the 
presumption of causation by demonstrating that the injury was not caused by the 
vaccination.298 If the HHS Secretary fails to rebut the presumption, then the 
presumption stands and the claimant wins.  
Alternatively, if the claimant’s claim does not appear on the vaccine injury table, 
then the claimant must prove causation and must do so under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.299 The claimant loses if he or she fails to meet the burden of 
proof, or if the HHS Secretary proves alternative causation.300 Under either scenario, 
the HHS Secretary may also challenge the compensation amount,301 and in the end, 
the Special Master makes the injury eligibility determination and the award 
compensation determination.302  
Similarly, this article envisions an administrative system with a special master 
falling under the judicial branch, and a government agency—probably HHS—
challenging the claim on eligibility and/or compensation level grounds. It is 
important to note the independence of the special master from HHS in the NVIC 
system, which eliminates concerns of improper influence from HHS on the special 
master.303 The same must be done with regard to the insurer no-fault system in order 
to preserve independence and impartiality.  
Beyond the general structural considerations, constructing a no-fault 
compensation scheme requires defining a compensable event and determining who 
should finance the no-fault system.304 In defining the compensable event, no-fault 
systems do not focus on tortious conduct and fault for the injury at hand,305 but 
rather, as with the NVIC, they focus on the issues of causation and the appropriate 
level of damages.306 Oftentimes, there is also a monetary damages threshold to 
                                                                                                                                            
 296 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12 (West 2012). 
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trigger application of the no-fault system, which focuses the system on more serious 
claims and keeps down the costs of operating the system.307  
 Applying this sort of scheme to an insurer liability fund, the injured beneficiary 
should be required to demonstrate an injury, causation from insurer activity, such as 
negligent cost cutting, and the appropriate level of compensation. Both the eligibility 
of a claim and the award compensation level could be determined through hearings 
and written filings under a preponderance of the evidence standard.308 The key issue, 
causation, could be established in one of two different ways, both with their 
advantages and disadvantages.  
The first option is to design a no-fault system to very loosely mirror the NVIC 
system. Under the NVIC system, the injury table lists various injuries, categorized 
by vaccine, with a time period in which the injury must arise for the claim to be 
eligible.309 With an insurer no-fault system, it is not possible to set up such a simple 
system. Unlike with vaccines, it cannot be said that a specific insurer action, such as 
a claim denial, leads to one of several specific injury types, such as death, stroke, or 
brain damage. Moreover, the list of possible injuries resulting from insurer actions is 
pretty much unlimited. Insurer actions can lead to any of a multitude of patient 
harms.  
Accordingly, the closest analogy to the NVIC system would be to create a table 
of insurer cost-cutting activities, such as claim denials, coverage approval delays, 
specialist restrictions, utilization management, utilization review, that would 
presumptively trigger a claim. However, in addition to identifying an insurer practice 
on the table, the claimant would also need to present some sort of injury and 
something additional to demonstrate the causal link between the injury and the 
insurer practice. The best way to accomplish this, in a cost efficient manner, would 
be to require something akin to a Certificate of Merit (“COM”), as is used in many 
state medical malpractice cases. In the medical malpractice context, as a condition of 
filing a medical malpractice claim, the COM requirement requires plaintiffs to file a 
brief expert statement delineating the provider’s breach of the standard of care and 
causation of the plaintiff’s damages.310 Similarly, the claimant to the insurer no-fault 
fund would have to present an expert statement identifying the claimant’s injury and 
delineating how the insurer’s practice caused the claimant’s injury. Combined with 
an insurer practice listed in the table, this would create a prima facie case or 
presumption of causation.  
Following establishment of a presumption of causation, the HHS Secretary 
would then have the opportunity to rebut the presumption by demonstrating 
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alternative causation, such as no causation or provider malpractice as the sole cause 
of the injury. The HHS Secretary could be held to a preponderance of the evidence 
rebuttal standard in order to ensure that the HHS Secretary does not challenge every 
claim that arises, thereby maintaining lower transactional costs.  
Though it seems unlikely, if the claimant identifies an insurer practice not listed 
on the table, then, as with the NVIC, the beneficiary would bear the burden of proof, 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, to demonstrate that that insurer 
practice caused the claimant’s injury. This alternative accounts for situations in 
which insurers come up with new cost cutting measures, not identified on the table, 
that potentially lead to patient harm. 
Since the NVIC model hardly fits like a glove in the insurer liability context, this 
model illustrates an alternative that promotes the core no-fault concepts of cost-
efficiency and expediency, while providing a check on frivolous claims. The 
claimant’s costs—a bare bones expert statement—and proof burdens—the mere 
statement of a prima facie case—are substantially less than they would be in the tort 
system. At the same time, potentially frivolous claims are deterred by the 
requirement that the claimant must find an expert willing to state, on the record, that 
causation exists and the fact that the HHS Secretary always remains available to 
challenge causation. However, the preponderance of the evidence standard should 
incentivize the HHS Secretary to attack only those causation claims that are truly 
frivolous.  
Recognizing the difficulties in creating an injury table in this context, an 
alternative causation approach is found in the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Compensation Act (“VBIA”), Virginia’s no-fault compensation system for 
birth-related injuries. Under the VBIA, the Virginia Workers’ Compensation 
Commission (“VWCC”) reviews relevant records to determine if a baby’s injury was 
due to birth-related medical malpractice and the appropriate level of compensation, 
using medical records, related documents, and sometimes interrogatories and 
depositions to make those determinations.311 Applying the VBIA model to the 
insurer liability context, a special master would play the same role as the VWCC and 
would determine the existence of a claimant’s injury, insurer causation, and the 
appropriate level of compensation using limited discovery from the claimant’s 
insurance company and the patient’s medical records.  
Critics might claim that the similarities between a VBIA-type system and the tort 
system, as well as the difficulty of proving causation in the insurer liability context 
might result in an informal duplicate of the tort system, with all of its attendant costs, 
delays and failures to compensate deserving plaintiffs.312 While the VBIA approach 
is fact intensive, it does avoid the injury table difficulties of the NVIC model. 
Moreover, there are several ways to limit the transactional costs and ensure an 
expedient and fair claims process in a VBIA model no-fault system.  
First, imposing strict time limits on pre-hearing discovery and the hearing 
process, with few, if any, options for extensions, should promote expediency. 
Second, limiting discovery cuts down on both the delays and costs involved in the 
                                                                                                                                            
 311 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5003-04, -5006-08.1 (2007). 
 312 See Smirniotopoulos, supra note 288, at 842-44 (discussing the difficulty of 
determining causation in a no-fault system applied to medical injuries, especially those 
involving injuries due to medical devices and drugs).  
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/5
2014] IT’S A MISTAKE  119 
 
claims process.313 Limited discovery also provides the added benefit of ensuring that 
the insurer has some skin in the game and is still properly incentivized to avoid cost 
cutting that leads to patient harm. In other words, if insurers know that they may 
have to perform some document production, respond to interrogatories and possibly 
participate in depositions, then they may take greater care to avoid harmful cost 
cutting. They will want to avoid the transactional costs involved in being a 
participant in the no-fault system process. This requirement addresses the criticism 
that removal of fault and participation of the alleged tortfeasor from the no-fault 
process hinders the ability of the process to improve quality of care.314  
Third, a lenient preponderance of the evidence standard for proving causation 
should also reduce transactional costs in proving a valid claim.315 Though such a 
standard may also result in overcompensation for some claimants who do not have 
valid claims of causation, the claimant is still required to meet a certain burden of 
proof. Moreover, the HHS Secretary provides a check on frivolous claims through 
the Secretary’s right to present evidence of alternative causation and to challenge the 
beneficiary’s claim.  
While the VBIA model may raise concerns that it is too much like the existing 
tort system in terms of costs and inefficiency, it has certain advantages, as well. 
First, it avoids the NVIC model problems of developing an injury table and allows 
for more flexibility in assessing potential claims. Second, the fact-intensive nature of 
the VBIA model requires some participation by insurers in the process, a cost that 
insurers will have to take into consideration when determining how aggressively 
they want to engage in cost cutting. Third, the fact-intensive nature of the VBIA 
model, unlike the NVIC model, may allow for better accuracy in ensuring that the 
most deserving claimants receive compensation. Regardless of which compensable 
event model is chosen, there should be built in checks on the damage awards to 
ensure that excessive damage awards do not swallow the no-fault system. First, the 
government should be allowed to challenge the level of compensation. Second, the 
final damages award should be based on compensatory damages, such as medical 
expenses, life-care-type expenses, and lost wages, as well as pain and suffering 
capped at a certain level.316 To allow for non-compensatory damages and/or 
potentially unlimited pain and suffering damages undermines the predictability and 
certainty that insurers need to buy into the concept of a compensation fund.317 
Restricting or capping the available damages also helps to limit the cost to 
administer the no-fault system.318 Moreover, limiting compensation to compensatory 
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damages addresses a common critique of the tort system that there is excessive 
payment for noneconomic injuries compared to compensatory damages.319  
On the surface damage limitations might appear to undercompensate 
beneficiaries compared to the tort system, but the reality is more nuanced. A cap on 
damages allows for more victims to be compensated, albeit at a lower level.320 
Injured beneficiaries are still assured some level of compensation, without much of 
their award being eaten up by litigation costs and attorneys’ fees. It is a tradeoff; 
injured beneficiaries get faster and more certain, but lower financial recoveries, but 
must forego potentially larger, but very uncertain and time-consuming efforts to 
obtain tort damages through the court system.321 While critics claim that this tradeoff 
undercompensates or fails to encompass the full range of injured individuals,322 the 
argument is especially weak with regard to an insurer no-fault system, because even 
claimants that lose their claims may still have viable medical malpractice claims 
against their healthcare providers for their injuries. 
3. Funding the Insurer No-Fault Liability Fund 
The second major issue to be addressed in developing a no-fault compensation 
system is the funding of the fund. Usually, the funding comes from charges imposed 
on those who tend to cause the injuries that are being compensated through the fund, 
which in the case of the NVIC system is the vaccine manufacturers.323 Applied to 
insurer liability, this would mean imposing a tax or fee on all individual exchange 
insurers. However, a better policy would be to spread the risk and costs further; the 
insurer liability fund should be funded through a tax or fee imposed upon all 
insurers, including employment-based plans and self-insured plans.  
Such an approach accomplishes two goals. First, the liability burden is spread out 
among many plans, having a less severe impact on any individual plan or only on 
                                                                                                                                            
requirement triggering eligibility for a no-fault claim can control the cost of administering a 
no-fault system). 
 319 See Engstrom, supra note 290, at 370 (explaining that one of the drivers behind no-fault 
automobile accident systems was the concern that there was overcompensation for 
noneconomic damages in the tort system, especially for minor automobile injuries). 
 320 See Gifford et al., supra note 282, at 255 (arguing that capping the NVIC damages 
allows for compensation of more victims as lower damage awards allow for spreading the 
damage awards across a larger group of individual victims). 
 321 See Jeffrey O’Connell & John Linehan, Neo No-Fault Early Offers: A Workable 
Compromise Between First & Third-Party Insurance, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 103, 134 (2005) 
(noting that in worker’s compensation systems the injured party exchanges prompt, limited 
pay-outs to forego the uncertain opportunity of the tort system’s riches). 
 322 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 314, at 115 (arguing that the VBIA has failed to 
reach out to the “full, intended population of eligible claimants”); Lindsay J. Stamm, The 
Current Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Need for Reform to Ensure a Tomorrow for 
Oregon’s Obstetricians, 84 OR. L. REV. 283, 306 (2005) (noting that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
contend that no-fault systems shortchange some injured parties who might otherwise fare well 
under the existing tort regime). 
 323 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(f) (West 2012) (funding the NVIC through an excise tax on 
each vaccine dose); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics 
Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 976 (1993). 
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those plans within the exchanges. The insurance industry, as a whole can better 
absorb the impact of the cost of the fund than a smaller group of individual exchange 
plans. Moreover, to the extent that insurers pass the fee along to their beneficiaries, 
the cost impact on beneficiaries should be lessened because the fund costs are spread 
out over so many insurers and their beneficiaries, not just the individual exchange 
beneficiaries.  
Second, part of the idea behind creating an insurer liability compensation fund is 
to level the playing field between individual exchange insurers and employment-
based plans. Under the status quo, employment-based plans have an unfair advantage 
over individual exchange plans because of ERISA preemption. The former can do 
more than the latter to cut costs without concern for potential liability consequences. 
Equity supports forcing ERISA plans to shoulder at least part of the liability burden. 
To fund the compensation fund through individual exchange insurers alone only 
moderately spreads the risks and costs and minimally alleviates the liability pressure 
faced by individual exchange insurers. 
A common concern with the funding mechanism of no-fault systems is that 
funding such systems without tying the funding to individual fault fails to incentivize 
those causing injury to mitigate the risk.324 Critics claim that where there is no 
individual blame or fault, there is no deterrent effect on negligent actors.325 This 
criticism is questionable given that the tort system has not effectively deterred 
medical malpractice, and at least one study found that no-fault systems provide 
better deterrence than the traditional tort-based system.326 
Even assuming that the criticism is valid, deterrence concerns may be reduced in 
several ways. First, if the VBIA compensatory event model is adopted, insurers 
against whom claims are made will still have to participate, to some extent, in the 
administrative process. The hassle and cost of participating in the claim process 
should encourage insurers to take care when engaging in cost cutting measures. 
Getting wrapped up in a myriad of no-fault claims every year certainly detracts from 
an insurer’s bottom line and profitability. Second, the fee or tax on insurers could be 
subject to increase annually, depending on the number and value of claims made 
against the fund in the prior year. If, in a given year, the awards against the fund are 
high, then a fee increase would occur the following year. Such a scheme would 
incentivize individual exchange insurers to collectively avoid engaging in risky cost 
cutting measures that could increase the number of claims against the fund and result 
in an annual fund fee increase that impacts all insurers. Third, the fund fees could be 
experience rated with regard to the individual exchange insurers’ contribution. In 
other words, an individual exchange insurer with a high number of no-fault claims in 
a given year would owe a greater fee the following year than an insurer with a better 
track record. This would likely cause an individual exchange insurer to carefully 
choose its cost-cutting measures, or risk an excess of claims connected to that insurer 
and a higher fund fee for the following year. Of course, if the no-fault system is 
                                                                                                                                            
 324 See Henry Huang & Farzad Soleimani, What Happened to No-Fault? The Role of Error 
Reporting in Healthcare Reform, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 7-8 (2009) (arguing, in 
the context of medical errors, that the lack of the stigma of fault in a no-fault system fails to 
sufficiently encourage doctors to avoid mistakes). 
 325 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 318, at 220. 
 326 See id. (finding that carefully designed no-fault systems are “far better placed to [deter] 
than negligence-based litigation”); Mor & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 278, at 626-27. 
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poorly designed, there is a danger that some weak beneficiary claims will prevail, 
while some deserving beneficiary claims fail, resulting in some insurers overpaying 
and others underpaying based on experience rating.327 Nonetheless, the use of 
experience rating may allow the fund administrators to better set the appropriate fees 
in order to ensure that the fund remains solvent.328 
4. Other Relevant Considerations 
Beyond defining the compensable event and the funding mechanism, there are 
several other matters that should be considered in developing an insurer no-fault 
system, including a statute of limitations, joint and several liability, comparative or 
contributory negligence, attorneys’ fees, and the exclusive nature of the fund 
remedy. First, there should be a timeliness requirement or statute of limitations for 
the insurer liability fund in order to promote predictability, efficiency, and to avoid 
stale claims. An appropriate statute of limitations could be borrowed from state 
medical malpractice statutes of limitation, since the injuries involved are similar to 
or the same as those in medical malpractice cases.  
Second, joint and several liability should not apply within the context of the 
insurer no-fault fund. Joint liability between providers and insurers is likely to be a 
common occurrence in this environment as beneficiary injuries may arise jointly 
from provider malpractice and insurer practices. However, the fund should only be 
responsible for the percent of damages flowing from the insurer practice. To allow 
for joint and several liability, increases the unpredictability and size of the awards 
against the fund and potentially forces the fund to seek contribution from a fellow 
tortfeasor, such as a provider, a costly and time consuming endeavor. Rather, the 
HHS Secretary and the claimant should be allowed to submit evidence as to how to 
apportion the damages, and the Special Master should make a decision regarding 
apportionment of damages attributable to the insurer practice. The claimant would 
then be left to pursue the rest of his or her damages in court against the other 
tortfeasor(s). Third, contributory or comparative negligence should also apply within 
the insurer no-fault liability fund. If the HHS Secretary can demonstrate that the 
claimant contributed to his or her own injury, then the fund liability should be 
decreased. Without contributory or comparative negligence, the fund would be 
overpaying in some situations and some claimants would receive a windfall. 
Fourth, attorneys’ fees are an important consideration. In the NVIC, attorneys’ 
fees are capped,329 but this has led to criticism that good attorneys’ are not 
incentivized to take these cases and that vigorous advocacy is discouraged because 
attorneys’ fees are awarded regardless of the outcome of the claim.330 Accordingly, 
attorneys’ fees should be large enough to encourage attorneys to take these cases, but 
not so large as to jeopardize the cost efficiency of the system. Moreover, the special 
master could be given discretion as to how much to award in attorneys’ fees, based 
                                                                                                                                            
 327 See Smirniotopoulos, supra note 288, at 842-43 (explaining that variation in claimant 
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on the strength of the causation claim, thereby incentivizing attorneys to vigorously 
represent their clients within the insurer liability fund system. 
Finally, unlike the NVIC system,331 the remedy available through the 
compensation fund should be final and should completely replace any available 
judicial remedy that an injured beneficiary has against his or her insurer. To allow 
for a judicial opt-out provision only reintroduces the tort system into the equation 
again and undermines the no-fault system. It drives up the costs of the system 
thereby limiting the funds available to victims and destroying the cost efficiency of 
the program.332 Injured beneficiaries would have two bites at the apple,333 and if the 
court system remains a resource for potential plaintiffs, then liability fears could 
drive up insurer costs and cause some insurers to drop out of the individual exchange 
market.334 Finally, despite the proposed finality of the remedy, it is important to 
remember that some claimants may also still have alternative remedies available 
through malpractice suits against their providers, even if they lose their insurer 
liability claim. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the lack of ERISA preemption for individual exchange insurers, the 
exchanges are full of potential perils for beneficiaries and insurers alike. Under the 
status quo, insurers are subject to potential costly liability if they engage in cost 
cutting that leads to patient harm. The status quo fails to recognize that not all cost 
cutting is bad and insurers should be encouraged to engage in beneficial cost cutting 
of wasteful care. Moreover, insurers should be encouraged to promote low costs 
within the exchanges in order to help the exchanges to thrive. 
Beneficiaries, on the other hand, deserve a remedy when they are injured by 
harmful insurer cost cutting measures. Nonetheless, unlimited liability of exchange 
insurers will only lead to high premiums and costs for exchange beneficiaries. Costs 
associated with liability and the threat of liability will most certainly be passed onto 
the consumer in the form of higher premiums. 
A balanced system should serve both the insurers’ and beneficiaries’ interests 
and there are a number of options available. Most options are not political feasible, 
practically feasible and/or are inequitable to either the insurers or the beneficiaries. 
However, a no-fault compensation is an attempt to find a middle ground. It seeks to 
benefit both the insurer, through limited liability and predictability, and the 
beneficiary, through limited, but more certain damage recovery. The no-fault 
                                                                                                                                            
 331 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-21(a) (West 2012) (allowing claimants to file suit against 
vaccine manufacturers if the claimant rejects the recommendation of the Special Master). 
 332 See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1084 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
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49Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
124 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:75 
solution is not the perfect solution. It has its drawbacks, but it effectively balances 
the interests at hand.  
Still, it is important to recognize that the no-fault solution may not be possible at 
this early stage of the exchanges. Oftentimes, the move to a no-fault system requires 
a true and real crisis, as with the NVIC and the Virginia and Florida birth injury 
legislation.335 Accordingly, it may require skyrocketing insurance costs within the 
exchanges, health insurers leaving the exchanges due to high costs and many tort 
suits against individual exchange insurers before a crisis level is reached and the 
impetus for legislative action arises.  
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